Job Creation in Development Finance Institution (DFI) Investments: Firm-Level Determinants and Effect of DFI Funding by Tauber, Ilja
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Job Creation in Development Finance Institution (DFI) Investments: 
Firm-level Determinants and Effect of DFI funding 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Master’s Thesis 
Ilja Tauber 
Aalto University School of Business 
Department of Finance 
Fall 2016 
  
 
Aalto University, P.O. BOX 11000, 00076 AALTO 
www.aalto.fi 
Abstract of master’s thesis 
 
 
Author  Ilja Tauber 
Title of thesis  Job Creation in Development Finance Institution (DFI) Investments: Firm-level 
Determinants and Effect of DFI Funding 
Degree  Master of Science in Economics and Business Administration 
Degree programme  Finance 
Thesis advisor(s)  Vesa Puttonen 
Year of approval  2016 Number of pages  62 Language  English 
Abstract 
This paper is concerned with the job creation dynamic of development finance institutions’ (DFI) 
investments and approaches the topic from two perspectives. Firstly, it reviews the key determinants 
of firm-level employment growth from general economic literature and examines how they explain 
job creation in DFI investments. Secondly and more interestingly, the effect of DFI funding itself on 
firm-level employment growth is examined. 
Utilizing a unique firm-level dataset of 239 DFI investments of Finnfund (Finnish Fund for Indus-
trial Cooperation Ltd), Finland’s primary DFI, during the years 2008 to 2014, this study finds sev-
eral interesting results. Examining how determinants of employment growth from general economic 
literature explain employment growth in DFI investments, a strong negative relationship of both 
firm size and capital intensity with employment growth is established. This result is in line with 
previous literature on the relationship between firm size and employment growth and with the 
Cobb-Douglas relationship respectively, but has not been previously empirically tested with a sam-
ple of DFI portfolio firms. More interestingly, when controlling for firm size and capital intensity, 
no statistically significant relationship between returns of DFI investments and firm-level employ-
ment growth is found. This parts from previous findings of DFI practitioner literature, suggesting 
potential lack of methodological rigor in these studies. 
Secondly, additional DFI funding is found to positively and statistically significantly effect firm-level 
employment growth in sample firms. By matching 96 Finnfund investments that received additional 
funding during the years 2008 to 2014 with a group of control investments not receiving additional 
funding through a propensity score matching (PSM) procedure, a statistically positive effect of ad-
ditional funding on average annual employment growth is established. This is the first paper to doc-
ument such a micro-level relationship between DFI funding and firm-level job creation. While the 
employment effect does not statistically persist in one of the matched comparisons and the robust-
ness analysis using a DID-PSM approach yields mixed results, general direction and magnitude of 
the observed effect strongly suggests that additional DFI funding has a positive effect on firm-level 
job creation. Considering that the positive effect of DFI funding on employment growth is observed 
as an increase in the rate of employment growth, not mere increase in number of employees, and is 
observable already within the same year of funding, non-financial benefits of DFI funding could 
have a big role in explaining the observed effect.  
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Tutkielma pyrkii selvittämään työpaikkojen luomista kehitysrahoitusyhtiöiden sijoituskohteissa ja 
keskittyy tarkastelemaan asiaa kahdelta kantilta. Ensiksi työ käy läpi lähdekirjallisuuden 
määrittelemät tärkeimmät, yrityskohtaisen työllisyyskasvun tekijät ja tarkastelee näiden tekijöiden 
suhdetta työllisyyskasvuun kehitysrahoitusyhtiöiden sijoituskohteissa. Toiseksi, työ tutkii 
kehitysrahoitusyhtiöiden rahoituksen vaikutusta yritystason työllisyyskasvuun.  
Tutkimuksen aineistona käytetään ainutlaatuista, yritystason aineistoa joka kattaa 239 Finnfundin 
(Teollisen Yhteistyön Rahasto Oy:n), Suomen suurimman kehitysrahoitusyhtiön, sijoituskohdetta 
vuosilta 2008 – 2014. Ensimmäiseksi, tarkasteltaessa työllisyyskasvun tekijöitä aineiston 
yrityksissä, sekä yrityksen koolla, että yrityksen pääomaintensiteetillä havaitaan vahva negatiivinen 
suhde työllisyyskasvun kanssa. Tulos on johdonmukainen aihepiirin lähdekirjallisuuden kanssa, 
mutta tekijöiden välistä suhdetta ei ole ennen empiirisesti tutkittu kehitysrahoitusyhtiöiden 
sijoituskohteissa. Lisäksi, kun yrityksen koko ja pääomaintensiteetti lisätään regressiomalliin 
kontrollimuuttujina, kehitysrahoitusyhtiöiden sijoituskohteiden sijoitustuotto menettää 
aikaisemmissa tutkimuksissa löydetyn tilastollisen merkittävyytensä sijoituskohteiden 
työllisyyskasvua selittävänä tekijänä. Tämä tulos kyseenalaistaa aihepiiriin liittyvien aikaisempien 
tutkimuslöydösten tutkimusmenetelmällistä oikeaoppisuutta.  
Työn toinen ja mielenkiintoisempi tutkimuslöydös on, että kehitysrahoitusyhtiön lisärahoituksella 
ja yritystason työllisyyskasvulla on tilastollisesti merkittävä, positiivinen suhde. Keskimääräinen 
työlliskasvu on merkittävästi korkeampi aineiston 96:lla yrityksellä, jotka saivat vuosina 2008 – 
2014 lisärahoitusta Finnfundilta, kuin vertailuryhmän yrityksillä, jotka eivät saaneet lisärahoitusta 
kyseisellä ajanjaksolla. Sopiva vertailuryhmä lisärahoitusta saaneille yrityksille luodaan Propensity 
Score Matching (PSM) –menetelmällä, käyttäen saman aineiston yrityksiä. Vaikkakin yhden 
vertailuryhmän kohdalla yritystason työllisyyskasvun ero ei ole tilastollisesti merkittävä ja tulosten 
robustisuusanalyysi hyödyntäen DID-PSM –menetelmää voidaan tulkita tuloksettomaksi, 
tilastollisen suhteen suuruusluokka ja positiivinen etumerkki, jotka ovat havaittavissa kaikissa 
suoritetuissa analyyseissä, viittaavat vahvasti siihen, että kehitysrahoitusyhtiön lisärahoituksella on 
positiivinen vaikutus yritystason työllisyyskasvuun. Lisärahoituksen vaikutus työlliskasvuun 
havaitaan suhteellisena yritystason työllisyyskasvuna, eikä pelkkänä työntekijöiden määrän 
kasvuna ja vaikutus on havaittavissa saman vuoden sisällä lisärahoituksesta. Tähän pohjautuen, 
vaikuttaa todennäköiseltä, että kehitysrahoitusyhtiöiden rahoitukseen liittyvät ei-taloudelliset 
hyödyt selittävät suuriltaosin havaittua suhdetta.  
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1. Introduction 
1.1 Background and motivation 
Development finance institutions (DFIs) are rapidly becoming one of the key channels for 
developed countries to subsidize and support economic development of developing countries (see 
e.g. Te Velde and Massa, 2011). DFIs are specialized development banks or subsidiaries mandated 
and supported by their governments to promote economically, environmentally and socially 
sustainable development in developing countries through financing and investing in profitable 
private sector enterprises. They are usually majority-owned by national governments and source 
their capital from national or international development funds or benefit from government 
guarantees. 
Given their development mandate, when managing their investment portfolios, DFIs are constantly 
evaluating potential investment opportunities across two key criteria: i) potential financial returns 
on investment and ii) potential development impact of the investment.  
In order to better track the success of their development mission, DFIs have started in increasing 
manner to measure development effects of their investments as quantifiable development impact 
metrics – these include e.g. number of jobs created by their investee firms, as well as the trade 
balance and tax revenue effect of investee firms in their domestic economies (Te Velde and Massa, 
2011 and Joujean and te Velde, 2013). However, while there is ample academic literature on 
investment-level determinants of financial returns in different asset classes, to help guide DFI 
investment managers when choosing their investment targets, there exists no academic literature 
on investment-level determinants of the different development effects. As an optimal DFI 
investment portfolio would maximize both the financial return and the development impact of the 
portfolio, information on determinants of development impact is critical for DFI fund managers 
when deciding on where to channel their investments. 
This study aims to fill this vacuum by focusing on job creation impact of DFI investments. Job 
creation is focused on for two reasons. Firstly, it is considered as one of the main development 
challenges currently faced by low income countries (Jouanjean and te Velde, 2013) and secondly, 
it is one of the most consistently tracked development impacts of DFIs, thus offering data of 
sufficient quality and quantity for an empirical analysis.  
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This paper approaches the job creation impact of DFI investments from two perspectives. Firstly, 
it reviews the key determinants of firm-level employment growth from general economic literature 
and examines their relationship with job creation in DFI investments. Secondly and more 
interestingly, the effect of DFI funding itself on firm-level employment growth is examined. This 
effect has not yet been examined by empirical literature and is interesting from at least two 
standpoints. Firstly, such an analysis can yield interesting insights to both DFI professionals and 
firms receiving DFI investments, to help improve their future operations. Secondly for 
policymakers working with economic development and interested in policies specifically pursuing 
employment growth, such an analysis provides an indication of whether supporting DFI activity is 
an efficient way for possibly achieving desired policy outcomes.  
1.2 Research problem and purpose 
According to Massa (2011), since the year 2005 an increasing number of DFIs have assessed the 
results of their investment operations by means of Development Outcome Tracking System 
(DOTS). DOTS measures impacts of DFI operations against a set of indicators classifiable into 
four categories: financial performance (e.g. ROI, ROIC and project cost), economic performance 
(e.g. contributions to target country’s employment and tax revenues), environmental and social 
performance (e.g. number occupational injuries, water and energy consumption, etc.) and private 
sector development (e.g. SMEs reached). While the past decade has seen such notable increases in 
both impact measurement and assessments of the activities of DFIs at macro levels (e.g. Te Velde 
and Massa, 2011 and Joujean and te Velde, 2013), there is however still very little evidence on 
empirical relationships of DFI job creation on micro-level (Joujean and te Velde, 2013).  
There is an extensive field of economic literature focused on firm-level employment growth 
determinants (see Section 2.1 for more details) and some attempts have been made to examine 
these relationships also in the context of DFI investee firms (e.g. IFC, 2007 and Wilton and Allen, 
2012). However, there are two key problems related to the currently available literature on micro-
level determinants of job creation in DFI investments. Firstly, as indicated by firm characteristics 
of the sample firms analyzed in this paper, it seems likely that DFI investee firms are on average 
quite different from the average firm in general firm population of developing countries (see 
Section 4.2 for more details). This potentially questions the generalizability of findings from 
general employment growth determinant literature on DFIs. Secondly, while explicit literature on 
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job creation in DFI investments (IFC, 2007 and Wilton and Allen, 2012) improves our 
understanding of the topic with its relevant sample focus, these papers lack some of the control 
variables and other methodological rigor present in peer-reviewed literature focusing on 
employment growth determinants of firms more generally (e.g. Haltiwanger et al., 2013 and Rijkers 
et al., 2014). Thus, there is a clear need for a more scientific approach in examining firm-level 
employment growth determinants in DFI investments.   
Also and more interestingly, relationship between DFI funding and job creation has not been 
examined at micro-level by any prior literature. This is striking, considering that as mentioned by 
Massa (2011), contributions to target country’s employment has been a key performance metric 
for DFI investments since year 2005. In order words, whilst DFIs often report and even boast on 
the number of jobs their investee firms have created, no study has critically examined the 
counterfactual of how job creation of investee firms would have developed had a DFI never 
invested in such firms. 
Utilizing a unique, firm-level dataset of 239 DFI investments of Finnfund (Finnish Fund for 
Industrial Cooperation Ltd), Finland’s primary DFI, during the years 2008 to 2014, this study aims 
to fill the previously outlined vacuum in empirical DFI literature. Firstly, this paper examines 
whether firm size, age and capital intensity are associated with employment growth in DFI 
investments in a similar manner as predicted by general firm-level employment growth literature 
(e.g. Cobb and Douglas, 1928, Davis, 1992, Haltiwanger et al., 2013 and Rijkers et al., 2014). The 
study will also examine the relationship between returns of DFI investments and firm-level 
employment growth, while controlling for these established employment growth determinants of 
general economic literature.  
Secondly, this paper looks at whether additional DFI funding received by 96 sample firms had an 
effect on employment growth of these firms during the sample years. The employment effect of 
additional DFI funding is examined by comparing average employment growth of sample firms 
receiving additional funding during a given year against propensity score matched (PSM) control 
firms from the same Finnfund sample that did not receive such funding. Examining the effect of 
additional funding on funded firms against characteristically similar DFI firms that were not 
funded, allows to make inferences of causal nature on the relationship between additional DFI 
funding and firm-level employment growth.  
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1.3 Contribution to existing literature 
This paper adds to existing literature on two fronts. Firstly, it looks at how determinants of 
employment growth that have cemented their place in general economic literature, namely firm 
size, age and capital intensity explain employment growth in DFI investments. Determinants of 
employment growth in DFI investments have not been previously studied with similar 
methodological rigor as determinants of employment growth in the general firm population (see 
e.g. Haltiwanger et al., 2013 and Rijkers et al., 2014). This is striking, considering that DFIs are 
the subcategory of investors to whom job creation of their investee firms is of specific interest. 
Also, extending this analysis, the relationship between DFI investments’ returns and job creation 
is examined for the first time when controlling for firm size, age and capital intensity. 
Secondly and more interestingly, firm-level effect of DFI funding on employment growth is 
examined. This fills a vacuum in DFI related literature, where the impact of DFI funding on 
employment growth has to date only been studied at a macro-level (Massa, 2011, and Joujean and 
te Velde, 2013).   
1.4  Key findings 
Firstly, examining how determinants of employment growth from general economic literature 
explain employment growth in DFI investments, several interesting relationships are established. 
This paper finds a strong negative relationship of both firm size and capital intensity with firm-
level employment growth in DFI investments. This result is in line with Haltiwanger et al. (2013) 
and Rijkers et al. (2014) on firm size and with the Cobb-Douglas relationship (Cobb and Douglas, 
1928) on firm capital intensity. However, unlike Haltiwanger etl al. (2013) and Rijkers et al. (2014), 
this paper finds no statistically significant relationship between firm age and employment growth. 
Also when controlling for firm size and capital intensity, no statistically significant relationship 
between returns of DFI investments and firm-level employment growth is observed. This parts 
from previous findings of DFI practitioner literature, which not controlling for these well-
established determinants of firm-level employment growth has found a positive relationship 
between DFI investment returns and investment-level job creation (Wilton and Allen, 2012).  
Secondly, additional DFI funding is found to positively and statistically significantly effect firm-
level employment growth in sample firms. By matching 96 Finnfund investments that received 
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additional funding during the years 2008 to 2014 with a group of control investments not receiving 
additional funding through a PSM procedure, a statistically positive effect of additional funding on 
average annual employment growth is established. This is the first paper to document such a micro-
level relationship between DFI funding and firm-level job creation. While the employment effect 
does not statistically persist in one of the matched comparisons and the robustness analysis using 
a DID-PSM approach (following Imai and Azam, 2012) yields mixed results, general direction and 
magnitude of the observed effect strongly suggests that additional DFI funding has a positive effect 
on firm-level job creation. Considering that the positive effect of DFI funding on employment 
growth is observed as an increase in the rate of employment growth, not mere increase in number 
of employees, and is observable already within the same year of funding, non-financial benefits of 
DFI funding could have a big role in explaining the observed effect. The findings leave space for 
interesting further research on whether DFI funding has a positive employment effect also on firms 
previously not backed by DFIs and how can financial and non-financial benefits of DFI funding 
potentially explain the observed effect. 
1.5 Limitations of the study 
Due to the novelty of the research topic and issues related to study design, this paper has several 
limitations that must be bared in mind when interpreting the results. First limitation concerns 
generalizability of the findings, as the study uses a sample of portfolio firms from only one 
development finance institution, Finnfund. As reviewed by Kingombe et al. (2011), there are 
significant differences across practices and activities of different DFIs and thus findings that apply 
in the context of one DFI may not apply for all DFIs. 
Secondly, the study does not take a stand on the debate of whether government subsidies and funds 
of “socially responsible” investors should be channeled into investments that foster employment 
growth in the first place. In other words, job creation is assumed in this study to be a desired 
outcome of DFI investment activity, but no stand is taken on whether such job creation is actually 
socioeconomically beneficial or whether it even should be a desired investment outcome. For 
instance, there is a wide debate on how not only quantity, but also quality of jobs created is 
developing countries is highly important (see e.g. Veldhuis et al., 2013, for an excellent summary 
of related literature). Such considerations are outside the scope of this study.  
6 
 
In addition, this study only examines relationships related to creation of direct jobs, due to 
unavailability of data for indirect and other employment effects. Jouanjean and te Velde (2013) 
note that it is very important for DFIs to develop their reporting to account also for indirect jobs, 
induced effects and second order growth effects, as employment effects in some type of projects 
(e.g. infrastructure) are mostly indirect. Hence, examining only direct jobs may only paint a partial 
or even wrong picture of the dynamics related to overall job creation in an economy. 
This study also does not test the impact of DFI funding on employment growth against any other 
firm financing source. Even if DFI funding might have a positive employment effect on firm-level, 
the effect needs to be analyzed relative to potential effects of alternative funding sources for 
developing country firms, as well as opportunity costs of DFI funding for the society, before 
making any policy decisions. For instance, Schreiner and Yaron (1999) provide an excellent 
framework for measuring the social cost of DFIs, which helps to answer the ultimate question of 
whether subsidizing DFIs is a good use of public funds or not.  
1.6 Structure of the thesis 
The rest of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2 presents the theoretical background and 
the previous empirical findings on firm-level job creation determinants and the link between DFI 
funding and job creation. Section 3 summarizes key insights from reviewed literature into testable 
hypotheses. Section 4 describes the data and the variables used in the study, as well as presents 
some key descriptive statistics of the data. In Section 5, econometric methodology used to test the 
developed hypotheses is outlined and discussed. Empirical results are presented in Section 6, first 
performing an analysis of the firm-level job creation determinants in DFI investments and 
subsequently examining the effect of DFI funding on employment growth of sample firms. Section 
7 concludes the paper and gives suggestion for further research. 
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2. Literature review and theoretical framework 
2.1 Determinants of job creation in DFI investments 
2.1.1 Portfolio firm size, age and capital intensity 
i. Firm size & age 
There is ample literature on firm-level determinants of job creation. Within this literature field, 
firm size and its role as a determinant of job creation is probably the most widely researched topic. 
Traditional view of social scientists, ever since the classic study of Birch (1979, 1981) has been 
that small firms create the most jobs. More recently, Neumark et al. (2011) established similar 
results, while addressing methodological criticism of Birch (1979, 1981) as proposed by Davis et 
al. (1996). Similar results have also been found outside of U.S., with e.g. Brixy and Kohaut (1999) 
finding a negative relationship between firm size and employment growth in Germany. One 
explanation used to explain this phenomenon is that large employment share of small businesses 
reflects inefficient allocation of resources and lower productivity relative to large businesses. 
However, a significant change to the status quo of firm size as an employment growth determinant 
was provided by Haltiwanger et al. (2013). Haltiwanger et al. (2013) find that actually firm age, 
rather than firm size acts as a driver of employment growth. Incorporating firm age into their model, 
they establish a strong negative relationship between firm age and employment growth and 
statistical insignificance of firm size. They attribute this to an “up-or-out” dynamic, where the most 
productive entrant companies expand and the weakest ones are driven out of business; as a result, 
it is the young and fast growing firms, as well as the large firms that create the most jobs. They 
conclude that the link between firm size and employment growth, previously so established in the 
field, is attributable to a strong positive correlation between firm age and size.  
Criscuolo et al. (2014) find support for this “up-or-out” dynamic also outside of U.S., in other 
OECD countries. However, they find firm size to have a significant, negative relationship on 
employment growth even after controlling for firm age. They conclude that disaggregating the age 
profile of businesses within different size classes provides complimentary insights to an analysis 
based solely on size dimension. 
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Extrapolating naïvely these findings from developed countries into a developing country can 
however potentially be problematic. As Kok et al. (2013) notes, characteristics and features of 
SMEs in developing countries differ strongly from developed countries. Large chunk of developing 
country SMEs are micro sized firms with low productivity that are born out of necessity, operating 
in crowded market segments with low entry barriers. This is a strongly different company profile 
to how SMEs are typically seen in developed countries. Therefore, it is unlikely that all 
socioeconomic benefits associated with SMEs in developed countries also apply in the context of 
developing countries (Kok et al, 2013). This notion is somewhat supported by findings of Rijkers 
et al. (2014), who using a unique developing country dataset from Tunisia conclude that while 
small firms generate most jobs, this effect is both smaller than suggested by developed country 
literature, sensitive to measurement error and dissapears when controlling for firm age. Results of 
Ayyagari et al. (2016) however suggest that even when controlling for firm age, small firms have 
higher employment growth rates in majority of developing countries.  
ii. Capital intensity 
Relationship between firm capital intensity and employment growth is described by the classic 
Cobb-Douglas production function (Cobb and Douglas, 1928), which has been widely tested to 
hold in various empirical settings at firm-level. Implications of the Cobb-Douglas production 
function on capital intensity and employment growth relationship is that if output (Y) remains fixed 
and amount capital (K) is increased, amount of labor (L) must decrease. Thus, an inverse 
relationship between firm-level capital intensity and employment growth can be expected. 
Contrary to the traditional Cobb-Doublas logic, e.g. Bigsten and Gebreeyesus (2007) find a positive 
link between capital intensity and employment growth in Ethiopia. They conclude that access to 
credit, which enterprises can use to grow their capital stock and modernize their production process, 
may have a positive effect on employment growth. This indicates that Cobb-Douglas relationship 
between firm capital intensity and employment growth does not necessarily hold in all settings and 
thus there is value to studying the relationship in new research contexts.  
iii. DFI related literature 
While there is no peer-reviewed literature on investment-level (i.e. firm-level) determinants of job 
creation in DFI investments, some practitioner reports exist. For instance, International Finance 
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Corporation (2013) analyzes data from 106 countries and over 20,000 firms, establishing a negative 
relationship with job creation for both firm size and age. Even though IFC (2013) findings support 
the idea of both size and age effect persisting in developing countries and in DFI investments within 
these countries, they lack the methodological rigor of most recent peer-reviewed papers on firm-
level employment growth, such as Haltiwanger et al. (2013) and Rijkers et al. (2014). This calls 
for a need to examine the relationship between size, age, capital intensity and job creation of DFI 
investee firms, while addressing appropriate methodological concerns. 
2.1.2 Returns on DFI portfolio firm 
There exist two relevant fields of literature concerning the relationship between financial returns 
and employment growth in DFI investments. First one relates to studies looking explicitly at DFI 
investments and the relationship between returns and job creation of these investments. IFC (2007) 
reports in a monitoring exercise on a strong correlation between investment projects’ financial 
performance and development outcomes, showing that 97% of projects with satisfactory or 
excellent financial performance led to a high development impacts. More specifically concerning 
job creation, only Wilton and Allen (2012) seem to have explicitly examined the relationship 
between return on DFI investments and the firm-level job creation of these investee firms. 
Analyzing data from 82 private equity funds (519 portfolio companies) in DFIs’ portfolio they find 
a positive correlation between fund IRR and job creation, with each 1% increase in IRR being 
associated with a 6.3% increase in firm-level employment growth.  
Regardless of the scarcity of literature on return-job creation relationship of DFI investments, there 
seems to exist a surprisingly widespread consensus amongst DFI professionals and other DFI 
literature, on a positive relationship between returns on DFI investments and the job creation 
impact of these investments. This is especially interesting, considering that studies which have 
established such a relationship, i.e. IFC (2007) and Wilton and Allen (2012), are both practitioner 
reports lacking the methodological scrutiny of peer-reviewed literature. 
Secondly, as financial returns received by an investor from an investee firm are closely traceable 
to financial performance or expectations of future financial performance of the investee firm, 
literature on the relationship between firm-level financial performance and employment growth is 
relevant to this study. Several studies have examined the role of firm-level profitability as a 
determinant of employment growth. Studying financial factors affecting firm-level profitability 
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and employment growth of Greek manufacturing firms, Agiomirgianakis et al. (2006) find a 
strongly positive relationship between company profitability metrics, such as sales profit margin 
and ROI, and employment growth. Broadman and Recanatini (2001) also establish a weak, but 
positive relationship in firm profitability and net employment growth of Russian firms during years 
1996 to 1999. More recently, using a unique developing country dataset from Tunisia, Rijkers et 
al. (2014) find a positive, but once again weak association between net job creation and firm 
profitability. If assuming that firm financial performance is related to returns received by an 
investor from an investment into the firm, literature on firm-level financial performance and firm-
level employment growth would seem to provide at least a theoretical basis for the findings of IFC 
(2007) and Wilton and Allen (2012).  
2.2 DFI funding and job creation 
Studies on relationship between DFI funding and job creation have to date focused purely on 
macro-level effects. Massa (2011) examines impact of DFIs on economic growth in general via 
GMM methodology on a panel dataset of 101 countries during the period 1986-2009. She finds 
that a 10% increase in multilateral DFIs’ investment commitments may increase growth by 1.3% 
in lower-income and 0.9% in higher-income countries. Whilst Massa (2011) does not specifically 
examine the impact of DFIs on country-level job creation, considering the established relationship 
between aggregate output and employment, also known as Okun’s Law, (Okun, 1962), inferences 
on likely positive employment effect can be made. Examining specifically DFIs’ impact on job 
creation, Jouanjean and te Velde (2013) perform a thorough quantitative analysis using a dataset 
covering DFI activity in over 70 developing countries for the year 2007. They find that during their 
sample year, 2.6 million jobs created in sample countries were attributable to the activities of DFIs 
studies. In addition, they also present an overview of existing approaches and studies examining 
the job impact of DFIs and conclude that there is no literature examining effect of DFI participation 
on job creation at a micro (firm) level.  
Jouanjean and te Velde (2013) also outline a theoretical framework on how DFIs can affect job 
creation on country and firm-level. They classify channels through which DFIs’ actions may 
influence job creation as direct effects (additionality and composition effect) and indirect effects. 
Of these DFI action channels presented by Joujean and te Velde (2013), only direct effects are 
however meaningful in micro-level analysis. Additionality refers to DFIs aim to be additional to 
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other financial flows in recipient country and solving market failures by providing finance in 
markets (both countries and industries), where firms face insufficient access to finance. To the 
extent that DFI’s investments are additional, they will increase the overall level of economic 
activity, and will likely increase employment (Jouanjean and te Velde, 2013). Composition effect 
essentially refers to DFIs tendency to support firms and intra-firm activities, which are innovative 
and transformational. As empirical studies in both developing and developed countries have 
established that innovation and employment growth typically goes hand in hand (see e.g. 
Kannebley Jr. et al., 2010 and De Kok et al., 2011) compositon effect acts as a channel for DFI 
investments to increase firm-level employment growth.  
Framework proposed by Jounjean and te Velde (2013) is highly similar to ideas of financial 
benefits of venture capital (VC) funding that VC funded firms receive. Balboa et al. (2011) 
summarizes rather coherently that benefits from venture capital funding to investee firms can occur 
either as benefits related to accessing i) additional financial resources (financial benefits) or ii) 
value added services (non-financial benefits) provided by the venture capitalist. Whilst there is no 
literature devoted directly to evaluating the impact non-financial benefits of DFIs, a number of 
empirical studies have examined non-financial benefits that VC funds provide to their investees. 
Large and Muegge (2008) provide an excellent summary on empirical studies on value added 
activities of venture capitalists. They identify eight different categories of such non-financial 
benefits present across empirical studies, of which they conclude operating, outreach, consulting, 
mentoring and recruiting seem to be the most influential. Operating activities include VCs 
providing direct, hands-on managerial involvement (e.g. active planning, monitoring and 
controlling) to the investee firm. Consulting involves providing intelligence and expertise to aid 
senior managers and professionals of portfolio company in decision making, while mentoring 
provides more spontaneous and on-demand support often required by managers in coping in the 
dynamic startup environment. VC funds also provide especially valuable services in helping to 
establish connections and contacts with key external stakeholders (outreach) and in helping to 
locate the best talent and committing them to join (recruiting). Supportive evidence on presence of 
such VC value added services is provided by Jääskeläinen et al. (2006) and Balboa et al. (2011), 
who both find that the amount of attention devoted by VC funds to their portfolio companies, as 
measured by the number of portfolio firms managed per investment manager, is strongly associated 
with portfolio company performance. 
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Even though studies on non-financial benefits of VC funding do not directly concern DFIs, 
considering that DFI activity is in many respects highly similar to VC activity, insights from VC 
literature seems highly relevant and applicable to DFIs. In addition, literature of more practical 
nature documents DFIs catering several non-financial benefits on firm-level to organizations. 
Comparing practices and activities of different DFIs, Kingombe et al. (2011) discuss how most 
DFI’s typically, in co-operation with local governments and other organizations, help both funding 
and bringing in management consultants and technical assistance required by investee firms. Te 
Velde and Massa (2011) estimate that annually up to $400m worth of support on advisory services 
for investee firms could be channeled through DFIs. Jouanjean and te Velde (2013) discuss how 
DFIs are active in setting economic, social and environmental performance standards, have 
representatives on company boards, act as catalysts in mobilizing other private investors, direct 
fund managers, provide technical assistance and act as a port of knowledge through which investee 
companies can adopt product and process innovation. Also Settel et al. (2009) reports how 
rationales of DFIs’ investments into developing market private equity include to be “an active 
investor, with an active approach to corporate governance and ESG practices”.  
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3. Hypotheses 
3.1 Determinants of job creation in DFI investments 
i. Size, age and capital intensity 
The literature reviewed in Section 2.1.1 indicates that there are robust empirical findings on 
negative relationships of firm size and firm age with firm-level employment growth from both 
developed and developing countries. This provides good grounds to believe that both firm size and 
firm age have a negative relationship with job creation in DFI investments. As discussed later on 
in this paper, characteristics of the sample firms indicate that DFI investments seem to be skewed 
more towards mid-sized, established firms when compared to average distribution of developing 
country firms (see Section 4.2 for more details). Nonetheless, the reviewed literature documents 
such wide presence of size and age effects in various research contexts that it seems likely for these 
effects to persist, even considering the skewed nature of the DFI investee firm sample of this study. 
Thus the following testable hypotheses can be formulated:  
Hypothesis 1.1 (H1.1a): Firm size is negatively related with job creation of DFI investments. 
Hypothesis 1.2 (H1.2a): Firm age is negatively related with job creation of DFI investments. 
Following the Cobb-Douglas intuition (Cobb and Douglas, 1928), which has been tested widely 
across various empirical settings, if output (Y) for a firm remains fixed and the amount capital (K) 
is increased, the amount of labor (L) must decrease. Also, considering the rather limited amount of 
empirical studies finding support to a contrary relationship between firm-level capital intensity and 
employment growth (namely Bigsten and Gebreeyesus, 2007), a negative relationship between the 
two variables in sample firms is expected. Thus the following hypothesis can be formulated: 
Hypothesis 1.3 (H1.3a): Firm capital intensity is negatively related with job creation of DFI 
investments. 
For each of the Hypotheses 1.1 – 1.3, there is a respective null-hypothesis, which is formulated as 
follows; firm size (H1.10), firm age (H1.20) and firm capital intensity (H1.30) has no statistically 
significant relationship with job creation of DFI investments. 
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ii. Financial returns 
As discussed in Section 2.1.2, the DFI literature available to date on the link between portfolio firm 
returns and job creation in DFI investments has found a positive relationship to between the two 
variables. Also as discussed in Section 2.1.2, these studies have methodological issues, which this 
paper aims to address - Wilton and Allen (2012) for instance do not control their regression 
specifications for firm size or age, as specified by Haltiwanger et al. (2013) and Rijkers et al. (2014) 
nor for capital intensity in any form. 
On the other hand, literature related to firm financial performance, such as firm profitability, and 
firm employment growth has predominantly concluded on a positive relationship to between the 
two, even when controlling for firm size and age (e.g. Broadman and Recanatini, 2001, 
Agiomirgianakis et al., 2006 and Rijkers et al., 2014). Considering the economic intuition that good 
firm financial performance should over time also yield good financial returns, findings of 
Broadman and Recanatini (2001), Agiomirgianakis et al. (2006) and Rijkers et al. (2014) offer 
convincing support to expect a positive relationship between financial returns and job creation in 
DFI investments studied in this paper. Thus the following testable hypothesis can be formulated: 
Hypothesis 1.4 (H1.4a): Financial returns are positively related with job creation of DFI 
investments. 
For Hypothesis 1.4, the null-hypothesis is as follows; financial returns have no statistically 
significant relationship with job creation of DFI investments (H1.40). 
3.2 DFI funding effect on job creation 
Literature reviewed in Section 2.2, suggests two key ways in which DFI funding could impact firm-
level employment growth: DFIs provide firms with i) additional financial resources (financial 
benefits) and ii) value added services (non-financial benefits). Due to nature of available data, it is 
not possible to examine separately how financial benefits and non-financial benefits associated 
with DFI funding impact firm-level employment growth. However, it is possible to examine 
generally the effect DFI funding has on job creation at firm-level.  
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This effect is examined by comparing sample firms receiving additional funding (i.e. capital 
infusions)1 from their “owner” investment funds (i.e. indirectly from DFI) to firms not receiving 
additional funding from their investment funds. As DFIs typically participate pro-rata in such 
capital infusions of their investee investment funds, rest of the paper will refer to additional funding 
received by sample firm from investment fund as additional DFI funding or simply capital infusion. 
Comparing the employment effect of additional funding provided to some sample DFI investee 
firms against characteristically similar sample DFI investee firms not receiving additional funding, 
can be considered somewhat similar to examining the employment effect of DFI funding for firms 
receiving such funding in general versus firms never receiving such funding. Performing such an 
analysis thus allows to make causal inferences of the relationship between DFI funding and firm-
level employment growth. 
Literature reviewed in Section 2.2, outlines several theoretical channels through which DFI funding 
can impact firm-level employment growth in a beneficial way. Both through the additionality and 
composition effect (Jouanjean and te Velde, 2013), DFI investment dollars should be able to 
increase the pace of employment growth by investing into most finance-constrained and innovative 
firms. Also several non-financial benefits of DFI funding, as outlined by both relevant practitioner 
literature (e.g. Kingombe et al., 2011, te Velde and Massa, 2011 and Jouanjean and te Velde, 2013) 
and applicable research from the VC field (e.g. Jääskeläinen et al., 2006, Large and Muegge, 2008 
and Balboa et al., 2011) indicate that DFI funding should have a positive effect on firm employment 
growth. Thus the following testable hypothesis can be formulated: 
Hypothesis 2 (H2a): Additional DFI funding has a positive effect on firm-level employment 
growth. 
For Hypothesis 2, the null-hypothesis is as follows; additional DFI funding has no statistically 
significant effect on firm-level employment growth (H20). 
 
                                                 
1 Capital infusions observed in the study can be essentially either i) executions of prior promised financing 
commitments or ii) entirely new financing rounds. The study will not separate between these two capital infusion 
categories.  
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4. Data and descriptive statistics 
4.1 Data 
This paper utilizes a unique, proprietary dataset of development finance institution investments 
provided by Finnfund (Finnish Fund for Industrial Cooperation Ltd), Finland’s primary DFI. It 
consists of firm-level data from portfolio companies of investment funds into which Finnfund has 
invested. The original dataset includes data on 451 companies from 42 investment funds over the 
period of 2008 to 2014, i.e. 7 years. However, at least one annual observation on the key variable 
of interest, net employment growth (%)2, was available for only 239 companies for the original 
sample – this acts as the major sample size limiting factor of the study. For these 239 companies, 
there is on average 3.3 annual employment growth observations, with a minimum of one annual 
observation and maximum of seven annual employment growth observations per company. This 
sums up to a total of 783 firm-year observations during the period 2008 to 2014. 
Other key variables of the dataset include both  firm total investment (i.e. the total amount in EUR 
invested by the Finnfund backed investment fund into a portfolio firm) and  firm fair value for firm 
i at year t, as well as year of initial investment into firm.3 Firm fair value is an objective, fair value 
estimate of a portfolio firm value provided by the investment fund managing the investment into 
firm i at year t and has been prepared in accordance to industry standards and regulations. Lastly, 
descriptive data on portfolio firms, such as firm geography, firm sector and asset class4 was also 
provided. 
Year of initial investment into firm is used as a proxy for age of firm, allowing to analyze the 
relationship between firm size, age and employment growth (see Section 5.2 for more details). 
Firm total investment is used for computing firm-level capital intensities and together with  
firm fair value for computing a measure of portfolio firm implied returns. This allows to examine 
how firm capital intensity and returns of DFI investments are related to firm-level employment 
growth of sample DFI investee firms (see Section 5.2 for more details). 
                                                 
2 See Section 5.2 for exact definition of net employment growth variable used in this study. 
3 See Section 5.2 for exact definitions of firm fair value and firm total investment variables. 
4 This refers to whether the reporting investment fund has an equity, debt or mezzanine investments in the sample 
portfolio firm.  
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In addition, firm total investment is used in the second part of the paper for analyzing the effect of 
additional DFI funding on sample firm employment growth. This analysis is performed by 
examining how employment growth in year t is affected for sample firms whose firm total 
investment has increased from year t -1 to year t. In this analysis, also year of initial investment, 
firm sector and data on GDP and GDP growth of sample firms’ domicile country is utilized. GDP 
and GDP growth is obtained from World Development Indicators (WDI) databank managed by the 
World Bank. 
All of the firm-specific variables discussed above were mostly available in the original dataset for 
the same firm-year observations as data on firm net employment growth. However, for the few 
firm-year instances where no observations for an explanatory variable are available to be paired 
with corresponding net employment growth observations, including such explanatory variables into 
a regression model further decreased the sample size of the performed analysis. This issue was 
predominantly related to firm total investment and firm fair valuation variables, but did not result 
in a dramatic decrease of sample size in any of the performed analyses. 
As the study utilizes a non-exhaustive panel data set of DFI investee firms during the period 2008-
2014, where not all firms have data for all variables for each year, it is meaningful to report both 
the number of firm observations and number of firm year observations per specific variable 
category. Figure 1, Figure 2 and Figure 3 show the distribution of sample across firm geography, 
industry and investment asset class. Also, see Figure 4 and Figure 5 in Section 5.2, for distribution 
of sample firm-year observations across firm size and age of investment.   
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Figure 1. Distribution of firm sample across geographies 
 
Figure 2. Distribution of firm sample across industries 
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Figure 3. Distribution of firm sample across asset classes as a DFI investee firm 
 
4.2 Descriptive statistics 
Table 1 presents the summary statistics of key firm-level variables for sample firms, used in this 
study. The presented statistics are computed using all available observations for 239 Finnfund 
investee firms, included in the final sample, during the years 2008 to 2014. The exact definitions 
for each reported variable are specified in the notes of the table.  
A summarizing look at the firm sample, as presented in Table 1 reveals several interesting insights. 
Firstly, mean firm size of the sample is a surprisingly high 500 employees and the median firm size 
is also nearly 200 employees. This implies that DFI investments are skewed more towards mid-
sized and established firms, rather than small firms. This skew is also evident from Figure 4 in 
Section 5.2, which shows the distribution of sample’s firm-year observations across firm size 
categories. Figure 4 shows that firms with 50-500 employees comprise over 59% of all firm-year 
observations of the sample.  For perspective on the firm size distribution of sample firms, Rijkers 
et al. (2014) find that Tunisian firm universe is heavily skewed towards small firms, with one-
person firms comprising approximately 83% of all firms in their sample.  
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Table 1. Summary statistics 
Summary statistics of the key firm-level variables from sample firms. The sample includes annual 
observations on these variables from 239 Finnfund investments during the years 2008 – 2014. 
 All sample firms 
 
N 
(obs) 
N 
(firms) 
Mean St. Dev Median 1st qrt. 3rd qrt Min Max 
Firm size  
(# of emp) 
783 239 500 863 195 79 521 0 7,151 
Employment growth  
(# of emp) 
783 239 40 232 8 -4 49 -2672 2,214 
Net employment 
growth rate (𝑔𝑖,𝑡 ) 
783 239 8.5% 39.0% 5.7% -3.5% 21.8% -200% 200% 
Firm fair value  
(000’ EUR) 
618 228 5,029.6 9,138.5 1,602.1 529.9 5381.0 0.0 76,957.3 
Firm total investment 
(000’ EUR) 
620 228 4,234.6 6,267.8 1,561.5 716.2 4,516.7 65.5 39,993.5 
Firm capital intensity 
(000’ EUR) 
619 227 47.2 155.1 10.5 3.8 29.8 0.1 2,086.7 
FV/IV ratio 620 228 1.09 0.68 1.00 0.75 1.28 0.0 4.76 
FV/IV ratio growth 
(%) 
469 197 1.2% 50.7% 0.0% -20.0% 13.8% -100% 542% 
Capital infusion (% of 
total investment)  
127 96 66.6% 159.8% 23.9% 5.9% 61.9% 0.0% 1184.3% 
Firm size is equal to the number of employees in firm i at year t. Employment growth is the change in firm size from 
year t-1 to year t. Net employment growth, 𝑔𝑖,𝑡 is defined as the change in employment from year t−1 to year t, 
divided by average firm size: 𝑔𝑖,𝑡 = 2
𝐸𝑖,𝑡−𝐸𝑖,𝑡−1
𝐸𝑖,𝑡 + 𝐸𝑖,𝑡−1
, where 𝐸𝑖,𝑡 denotes employment in firm i at year t (see Section 5.1 
for more details). Firm fair value is an objective, fair value estimate of firm value for firm i at year t, provided by the 
investment fund that has invested into the company. Firm total investment is the sum of cumulative fund investments 
into firm i at year t. Firm capital intensity is defined as the ratio of firm total investment for firm i at year t to firm 
size for firm i at year t. FV/IV ratio for firm i at year t is equal to ratio of fair value of firm i at year t to firm total 
investment for firm i at year t (see Section 5.2 for more details). FV/IV ratio growth is equal to the change in FV/IV 
ratio from year t-1 to year t. Capital infusion is equal to change in firm total investment for firm i from year t-1 to 
year t. 
Considering that the firm sample of Rijkers et al. (2014) essentially comprises the entire firm 
universe of Tunisia, this simple comparison quickly highlights the difference between a typical 
DFI investee firm and a typical firm from the general developing country firm population. Even 
though firm sample of Rijkers et al. (2014) only covers one specific case of firm size distribution 
in a developing country, similar findings have been established by Wiboonchutikula (2002) from 
Thailand. Wiboonchutikula (2002) shows that in Thailand, firms with less than 300 employees 
comprised 98.8% to 97.7% of the entire firm universe during the year 1987 to 1996. Considering 
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that relative prevalence of small firms in countries is known to be negatively related to national 
income per capita (see Poschke, 2014, for an excellent overview of related literature), it seems 
highly likely that DFI investee firms in general do not represent a typical developing country firm 
with regards to firm size and possibly other firm characteristics. This highlights the importance of 
examining firm-level employment growth determinants (e.g. firm size, age and capital intensity) 
that have been established in firm samples following a firm characteristic distribution typical to 
developing countries (e.g. Rijkers et al., 2014), in a DFI context, which does not seem to follow 
such a distribution.  
As indicated by Table 1, on average, sample firms have exhibited an 8.5% annual employment 
growth during 2008 to 2014. This figure is in line with IFC Job Creation Study (2013), where via 
enterprise surveys an average annual employment growth rate of 8.8% for DFI portfolio firms in 
the services sector and of 5.2% for DFI portfolio firms in the manufacturing sector over the period 
of 2006 to 2010 is found. It is challenging to compare the average employment growth rate of this 
paper’s sample firms directly to other, non-DFI contexts, due to the very heterogeneous distribution 
of the sample across firm geographies, industries and size classes. However, even without such 
out-of-sample comparisons, the observed 8.5% average annual employment growth rate does 
suggest a healthy company expansion rate and would support the idea of sample DFI investee firms 
being in established growth stages. 
Average employment growth rate for the sample is especially interesting in comparison with the 
average growth rate of firm valuation (FV/IV ratio growth %). While employment has annually 
grown at 8.5%, firm valuation has only increased on average by 1.2% over the period. This would 
again support the idea of sample firms being on average in growth phases, as when firms expand 
rapidly (e.g. via external capital financing) it seems intuitive that growth pace in number of 
employees for such firms would exceed the growth pace of their financial performance and thus 
also firm valuation.    
Capital infusions, i.e. cases of additional DFI funding, are significantly present in sample firms. 
Nearly half of sample firms (40.1%) receive a capital infusion at some point during the years 2008 
to 2014. These capital infusions are also significant in size, with average additional investment of 
a DFI backed investment fund being 66.6% and median 23.9% of fund total investment with firm. 
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As mentioned previously in Section 3.2, DFIs typically participate pro-rata in such capital 
infusions of their investee investment funds. 
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5. Research methodology 
5.1 Dependent variable 
The aim of the study is to examine which firm characteristics act as determinants of job creation in 
development finance investments and to investigate the effect that DFI funding has on job creation. 
Following the methodology used by some of the most seminal papers on job creation determinants, 
i.e. Davis et al. (1996) and Haltiwanger et al. (2013) and more recently Rijkers et al. (2014) in a 
developing country context, job creation is measured as net employment growth, 𝑔𝑖,𝑡  where the 
change in employment from year t−1 to year t, divided by average firm size. More specifically, 
𝑔𝑖,𝑡  is define as follows:  𝑔𝑖,𝑡 = 2
𝐸𝑖,𝑡−𝐸𝑖,𝑡−1
𝐸𝑖,𝑡 + 𝐸𝑖,𝑡−1
, where 𝐸𝑖,𝑡 denotes employment in firm i at year t. 
𝑔𝑖,𝑡 is the dependent variable in all regression specifications examining net employment growth (or 
also alternatively called job creation). 
5.2 Hypothesis I 
To analyze the relationship between firm size, firm age and job creation of DFI investments, 
following Haltiwanger et al. (2013) and Rijkers et al. (2014), net employment growth is regressed 
on firm size and age dummies separately and subsequently jointly. Parting from these previous 
studies, only base year size classification of firms is used in assigning firms to different size 
categories.5 Base year firm size is measured as firm size in the previous year (i.e. year t – 1) for all 
firms and size classes are selected following Haltiwanger et al. (2013). Figure 4 shows the 
distribution of sample firm-year observations across the firm size categories used in this study.  
Due to unavailability of a direct firm age measure, sample firms are grouped into age categories 
using age of DFI backed investment fund investment into firm as proxy for firm age. Age of DFI 
backed fund investment into firm (referred to as age of investment from here on) is defined as the 
                                                 
5 Average firm size classification is used in parallel to base year firm size classification by both Haltiwanger et al. 
(2013) and Rijkers et al. (2014). However average firm size is not an appropriate measure for firm size in this study, 
as firms entering or exiting the sample at year t are not necessarily companies that have started or seized to exist in 
year t. Rather, they are firms in which Finnfund has decided to invest in during year t. Because of this, the companies 
entering and exiting the sample of this study will be clearly larger than companies entering or exiting samples of 
Haltiwanger et al. (2013) and Rijkers et al. (2014), whose datasets cover the entire firm universe of USA and Tunisia 
respectively. Thus, applying the average firm size classification method would significantly underestimate the likely 
firm size of sample firms, year before entering or year after exiting the sample of this study.  
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difference between the current year, i.e. year t for firm i and the year of first fund investment into 
firm i, i.e. year t – n. Age of investment is seen as an appropriate proxy for firm age, because DFIs 
often invest in companies at quite early stages. Age classification is completed following 
Haltiwanger et al. (2013), with slight adjustment of grouping criteria, in order to better match the 
prevalence of firm-year observations within the sample across different age classes (see Figure 5 
for distribution of sample firm-year observations across age of investment categories). 
Figure 4. Distribution of firm-year observations across firm size categories 
 
Figure 5. Distribution of firm-year observations across age of investment categories 
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For both size and age analysis, panel data regressions are run with company and time fixed effects, 
to exclude potential impacts of unobserved time and company varying factors.   
Secondly, after exploring the relationship between firm size, age and job creation in the sample, 
methodology of Haltiwanger et al. (2013) and Rijkers et al. (2014) is extended to analyze the 
relationship of firm capital intensity and returns of DFI investments (i.e. implied firm returns) with 
sample firm employment growth. Relationship between firm capital intensity and job creation of 
DFI investments is examined by regressing 𝑔𝑖,𝑡 on a simple measure of capital intensity, 
𝑐𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖,𝑡 =  𝑓𝑖𝑟𝑚 𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑖𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖,𝑡/𝐸𝑖,𝑡, 
where 𝑓𝑖𝑟𝑚 𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑖𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖,𝑡 is the sum of cumulative DFI backed fund investments into firm 
i at year t and 𝐸𝑖,𝑡 is the number of employees in firm i at year t. Similar to firm size and age 
analysis, company and time fixed effects panel data regressions are used to exclude potential 
impacts of unobserved time and company varying factors on the outcome variable. 
Relationship between financial returns and job creation of DFI investments is examined by 
regressing 𝑔𝑖,𝑡  on the change in firm fair value-to-firm total investment ratio (FV/IV ratio). 
FV/IV ratio for firm i at year t is calculated as the ratio of fair valuation6 of firm i at year t to  
sum of cumulative fund investments into firm i at year t:  
𝐹𝑉/𝐼𝑉𝑖,𝑡 =  𝑓𝑖𝑟𝑚 𝑓𝑎𝑖𝑟 𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒𝑖,𝑡 / 𝑓𝑖𝑟𝑚 𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑖𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖,𝑡. Thus ∆𝐹𝑉/𝐼𝑉𝑖,𝑡 =  
𝐹𝑉/𝐼𝑉𝑖,𝑡
𝐹𝑉/𝐼𝑉𝑖,𝑡−1
− 1 , 
where 𝐹𝑉/𝐼𝑉𝑖,𝑡  denotes the FV/IV ratio for firm i at year t provides the implied financial return of 
DFI investment in firm i at year t. ∆𝐹𝑉/𝐼𝑉𝑖,𝑡  is used as a proxy for financial return of DFI 
investment into firm i in this paper. 
Change in firm FV/IV ratio, rather than direct change in firm fair value is used to track financial 
returns from DFI investments. This is because firm FV/IV ratio controls for the change in firm fair 
value, which might be driven by the increase or decrease in firm total investment (occurring from 
e.g. additional infusions of capital by fund shareholders or ownership divestments), making it a 
more accurate measure of actual returns yielded by the investment. 
                                                 
6 Firm fair value is an objective, fair value estimate of a portfolio firm value provided by the investment fund 
managing the investment into firm i at year t and has been prepared in accordance to appropriate industry standards 
and regulations.  
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5.3 Hypothesis II 
5.3.1 General methodological approach 
To examine the effect of DFI funding on firm-level job creation, a series of econometric analyses 
is performed. Firstly, the difference between average annual employment growth of sample firms 
receiving additional DFI funding during year t and firms not receiving additional DFI funding 
during year t is compared. For this and subsequent analyses, a dummy variable for additional DFI 
funding, i.e. 𝑐𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑖𝑛𝑓𝑢𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖,𝑡  is constructed. 𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑖𝑛𝑓𝑢𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖,𝑡 is assigned a value of 1 for 
firm i at year t, if the change in firm total investment for firm i from year t-1 to year t is greater than 
0 and is assigned a value of 0 otherwise. Figure 6 shows the distribution of 
𝑐𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑖𝑛𝑓𝑢𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖,𝑡 across sample years. 
Figure 6. Distribution of additional DFI funding across sample years 
 
There is however a high likelihood of an endogenous relationship existing between additional DFI 
funding and employment growth (e.g. portfolio firms with strong economic and employment 
growth ex-ante are probably more likely to receive additional DFI funding). Thus to establish a 
more robust causality relationship between the two variables, firms receiving additional funding in 
year t (“treated” firms) are matched with characteristically similar firms that did not receive 
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additional funding in year t (control firms) and difference in annual employment growth between 
“treated” firms and matched control firms (i.e. “treatment effect” of additional DFI funding) is 
examined.  
To perform such matching, the nearest neighbor matching (NNM) procedure (Rubin, 1973) and 
Kernel matching procedure (Heckman et al., 1998) are used. NNM is used as it is probably the 
most common and intuitive matching procedure, whilst Kernel matching is used following Imai 
and Azam (2012), whose study design and dataset is highly similar to those in this paper. After 
completing propensity score matching of sample firm-year observations with each respective 
matching method, difference in average annual 𝑔𝑖,𝑡  between treated and control firms is compared 
and tested for statistical significance. Additional robustness analysis of results derived from NNM 
and Kernel matching methods is performed also following Imai and Azam (2012), as well as Smith 
and Todd (2005), via difference-in-difference propensity score matching (DID-PSM).  
In order to complete the outlined matching procedures, estimation of propensity scores, predicting 
the probability of a sample firm to receive additional DFI funding during a given year, is required. 
The propensity scores will be estimated using two approaches; in-sample model (ISM) and out-of-
sample model (OSM). Both approaches involve estimation of logit models on the likelihood of a 
firm to receive a additional DFI funding during a given year, with the difference of IS model being 
estimated using all available firm-year observations, whereas OS model is estimated using only 
observations for firms prior to the period when they potentially received their first additional DFI 
funding.7 In theory, latter approach should yield more robust propensity score estimates, however 
as discussed in Section 6.2, given the nature of the sample there are methodological issues to be 
considered with both approaches.  
5.3.2 Selection of explanatory variables for propensity score matching 
To estimate propensity scores needed in propensity score matching, logistic regressions on firm 
probability of receiving a capital infusion, 𝑐𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑖𝑛𝑓𝑢𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖,𝑡 will be run against a set of 
explanatory variables. Related literature and economic intuition serve as the basis for selection of 
explanatory variables used in propensity score estimation.  
                                                 
7 For firms not receiving a single capital infusion during the entire sample, all available observations are included. 
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First variable to be included is firm size. Kingombe et al. (2011) find notable differences across 
DFIs according to the firm size focus of their investment practice. According to Kingombe et al. 
(2011), European Development Finance Institutions (EDFI) member DFIs (this includes Finnfund) 
are more engaged in SME finance, whereas for instance IFC DFIs tend to finance larger projects 
and ventures. Settel et al. (2009) also notes a skew in private equity fund focus of certain DFIs 
towards SME funds, rather than DFI investments being equally distributed across all firm size 
categories. Studying micro-level impacts of DFI financing in Ghana, Kapstein et al. (2012) find 
differences in firm size as one of the determinants of subsequent access to finance.  More generally, 
Ayyagri et al. (2016) also find statistically significant differences in access to finance for different 
firm size classes across 50,000 firms in 70 developing countries. Thus 𝑓𝑖𝑟𝑚 𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖,𝑡 is included as 
an explanatory variable of logistic regression, referring to the number of employees for firm i at 
year t.  
Age of investment is second explanatory variable to be included. This is based on pure economic 
intuition, which goes as follows. DFI investments typically occur in several stages, either as 
promised total investment is being paid out in several commitments or as entirely new financing 
rounds occur. It thus seems intuitive that firms are more likely to receive capital infusions in early 
stages of their life as a fund portfolio company, rather than at later stages when they have typically 
established consistent cash flows and thus become financially more self-sustainable. Thus, age of 
investment, as defined previously in Section 5.2, is included as an explanatory variable.  
As the third explanatory variable used in estimating the probability of sample firm to receive 
additional DFI funding, firm sector is included. Massa (2011) documents both differing degrees of 
DFI investment participation across different sectors and how DFI investments in different sectors 
yield differing impacts on economic growth of recipient country. Kingombe et al. (2011) provide 
a thorough comparison of practices and investment activities of key global DFIs, showing 
significant differences in sector focuses across DFIs. They also note that several DFIs have a 
focused strategy within specific sectors and geographies. In light of these studies, it seems likely 
that firm sector will have a meaningful impact of whether firm will receive additional DFI funding 
or not and should be included as an explanatory variable. Thus a dummy variable 𝑓𝑖𝑟𝑚 𝑠𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑖 is 
included as an explanatory variable and is assigned a value of 1 if firm i belongs to a specified 
sector and a value of 0 otherwise. Following typical sector classifications used in DFI literature 
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(e.g. Massa, 2011 and Kingombe et al., 2011) sample firms are assigned as belonging to one of the 
following sectors: financial, infrastructure8, manufacturing & services and agribusiness. 
Lastly, both GDP and GDP growth rate are included as explanatory variables for logistic regression 
on 𝑐𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑖𝑛𝑓𝑢𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖,𝑡. Level of GDP and GDP growth rate of a country receiving foreign direct 
investment (FDI) are well known determinants of FDI as they are believed to be good measures of 
market size and market growth for investors (see e.g. Schneider and Frey, 1985, Tsai, 1994 and 
Bevan and Estrin, 2004). Following Schneider and Frey (1985), one year lagged measures of both 
GDP and GDP growth rate are incorporated into the model as explanatory firm variables used for 
propensity score estimation. One year lagged GDP is added to the model as 1-yr 
𝑙𝑎𝑔𝑔𝑒𝑑 𝑙𝑜𝑔 𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑗,𝑡 , the natural logarithm of GDP (in nominal US$) of domicile country j for firm 
i at year t-1. 1-yr 𝑙𝑎𝑔𝑔𝑒𝑑 𝐺𝐷𝑃 𝑔𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ𝑗,𝑡 is defined as 
∆1𝑦𝑟 𝑙𝑎𝑔𝑔𝑒𝑑 𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑗,𝑡 =  
GDPj,𝑡−1
GDPj,𝑡−2
− 1, where 𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑗,𝑡  is the GDP (in nominal US$) of domicile 
country j  for firm i at year t.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
8 Following this classification, infrastructure includes sample firms from both the infrastructure and energy 
industries of the classification used in Figure 2 in Section 4.1. 
30 
 
6. Empirical results 
6.1. Determinants of job creation in DFI investments 
6.1.1 Firm size, age and capital intensity 
Table 2 presents the results of fixed-effects panel regressions of net job creation (gi,t) on firm size 
and age dummies and firm capital intensity. Specifications (1) and (2) present the results of 
regressing gi,t on firm size and age dummies respectively. In specification (3) gi,t is regressed 
jointly on both firm size and age dummies. Specifications (4) reports the results of regressing gi,t 
on firm capital intensity, while specification (5) extends specification (4) by also including firm 
size dummies in the regression. Omitted variable for regressions including size dummies is firms 
with 2500 or more employees and for regressions including age dummies is firms with 15 years or 
more since receiving their first investment. Thus in joint regressions of firm size and age, i.e. in 
specification (3), the omitted category is firms with 2500 or more employees and with 15 years or 
more since their first investment. The coefficients resulting from specifications (1), (2), (3) and (5) 
are thus relative to each of these omitted categories. 
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Table 2. Regression results of net employment growth vs. firm size, age and capital intensity 
Results of fixed-effects panel regressions of net employment growth (𝑔𝑖,𝑡) on firm size and age 
dummies and firm capital intensity. For all specifications, the regression is executed on all sample 
firms with available data and on the time period from 2008 to 2014. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Firm size      
0-19 1.646*** 
(7.53) 
 1.532*** 
(7.06) 
 1.651*** 
(6.63) 
20-49 1.069*** 
(5.11) 
 0.963*** 
(4.61) 
 1.041*** 
(4.39) 
50-99 0.612*** 
(3.10) 
 0.507*** 
(2.56) 
 0.502** 
(2.21) 
100-249 0.464** 
(2.44) 
 0.337** 
(1.76) 
 0.385* 
(1.73) 
250-499 0.347* 
(1.92) 
 0.254* 
(1.40) 
 0.261 
(1.23) 
500-999 0.166 
(1.01) 
 0.136 
(0.82) 
 0.0063 
(0.03) 
1000-2499 0.113 
(0.80) 
 0.133 
(0.95) 
 0.143 
(0.95) 
Age of investment      
0-1  0.260 
(0.72) 
0.193 
(0.59) 
  
2-3  0.189 
(0.58) 
0.151 
(0.51) 
  
4-5  0.117 
(0.40) 
0.094 
(0.35) 
  
6-7  0.150 
(0.56) 
0.072 
(0.30) 
  
8-9  0.047 
(0.22) 
0.057 
(0.30) 
  
Capital intensity    -0.00075*** 
(-3.10) 
-0.00097*** 
(-4.61) 
      
Constant -0.505*** 
(-3.0) 
-0.134 
(-0.49) 
-0.505* 
(-1.66) 
0.0105 
(0.25) 
-0.419** 
(-2.12) 
Firm fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N (obs) 783 776 776 619 619 
N (firms) 239 237 237 227 227 
R-squared 0.2283 0.0428 0.2302 0.0653 0.3139 
All specified regression equations are computed as fixed effects panel regressions with year dummies. Dependent 
variable for all equations is net employment growth, 𝑔𝑖,𝑡  is defined as follows: 𝑔𝑖,𝑡 = 2
𝐸𝑖,𝑡−𝐸𝑖,𝑡−1
𝐸𝑖,𝑡 + 𝐸𝑖,𝑡−1
, where 𝐸𝑖,𝑡 denotes 
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employment in firm i at year t. Base year firm size is used for size classification in all equations with size dummies 
and age of investment is used for age classification in all equations with age dummies. Base year firm size is measured 
as firm size in the previous year, i.e. year t – 1. Age of investment is defined as the difference between the current year, 
i.e. year t for firm i and the year of initial DFI investment into firm i, i.e. year t – n.  𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖,𝑡, is defined 
as 𝑓𝑖𝑟𝑚 𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑖𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖,𝑡  / 𝐸𝑖,𝑡 where 𝑓𝑖𝑟𝑚 𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑖𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖,𝑡 is the sum of cumulative fund investments into 
firm i at year t and 𝐸𝑖,𝑡 denotes the number of employees in firm i at year t.  Statistical significance of coefficients is 
denoted as follows: *P < 0.1; **P < 0.05; ***P < 0.01. 
Results of the fixed-effects panel regressions, as presented in Table 2, reveal a number of 
interesting relationships. First of all, in line with numerous previous studies (e.g. Davis et al., 1996, 
Haltiwanger et al., 2013 and Rijkers et al. 2014), a strong and statistically significant inverse 
relationship between firm size and employment is established. The findings imply that firms 
belonging to smallest firm category (0 – 19 employees) exhibited on average 165 percent higher 
net job creation rate than firms in the largest firm category (2500+ employees). Magnitude of the 
size effect is rather pronounced when comparing to findings of Rijkers et al. (2014) and 
Haltiwanger et al. (2013), where the corresponding employment creation premium for small firms 
(below 20 employees) using base size specification ranged from 1 to 20 percent and 7 to 20 percent 
respectively. The difference in magnitude can however, at least partially, be explained by the fact 
that firms in this sample, i.e. firms receiving DFI investment, are firms growing faster than a typical 
small firm. Also, Rijkers et al. (2014) find a rather pronounced young firm employment growth 
premium (ranging from 72% to 217% for firms aged 0 to 1 years), which is, as later discussed in 
this section, not observed in this sample. Thus it seems likely that small firms could indeed have 
an employment growth premium of significant magnitude, especially if they capture partially the 
employment growth effect of young firms. 
The strong inverse relationship between firm size and job creation persists even after controlling 
for age of investment, i.e. the proxy for firm age in this study. Even though the behavior of age of 
investment coefficients are in line with findings of Haltiwanger et al. (2013) and Rijkers et al. 
(2014) both in direction and magnitude of the impact, none of the coefficients are statistically 
significant even at 10% confidence level.  
The most likely explanation behind these results, is that even though age of investment is very 
likely positively correlated with firm age, this correlation is not strong enough. In other words, the 
proxy used for firm age in this sample is not accurate enough to produce similar results to 
Halitwanger et al. (2013) and Rijkers et al. (2014). Including age of investment in regression 
equation with size, however similarly to Haltiwanger et al. (2013) and Rijkers et al. (2014), 
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decreases the magnitude of size effect. Controlling for age, employment growth premium for 
smallest firms is 153.2% and premium remains statistically significant up until 250-499 employee 
size category, where the premium is 25.4%.  
Considering the statistical insignificance of age of investment in the sample, as shown in 
specification (2), age dummies are not included in specification (5) or in further regression analysis 
on the relationship between returns of DFI investments and job creation. This decision is also made 
due to minimal increase of model fit observed between specifications (1) and (3), with R-squared 
values of 0.2283 and 0.2302 respectively. 
Results of regression of net employment growth on firm capital intensity, as shown in 
specifications (4), are statistically significant at 1% level and are in line with the Cobb-Douglas 
intuition. Every 10,000 EUR increase in firm capital intensity, which implies a c. 21% increase 
relative to the average capital intensity of sample firms9, is associated with a 0.75% decrease in 
employment growth of sample firms. Interestingly, when controlling for firm size in specification 
(5), not only the statistical significance of the capital intensity persists at 1% but also the magnitude 
of the effect increases. Controlling for firm size, a 10,000 EUR increase is associated with nearly 
1% decrease in firm employment growth, while one standard deviation increase in capital intensity 
is associated with slightly above 15% decrease in sample firm job creation – these are economically 
meaningful magnitudes. Inclusion of for firm capital intensity alongside firm size dummies also 
significantly increases the explanatory power of the regression model, as indicated by the increase 
of R-squared from 0.2283 in specification (1) to 0.3139 in specification (5). Thus, it seems justified 
to control for both firm size and firm capital intensity when subsequently analyzing the relationship 
between returns of DFI investments and firm-level employment growth of these portfolio firms.  
All in all, based on the analysis of this section, null hypotheses H1.10 and H1.30 can be rejected 
and hypotheses H1.1a and H1.3a can be accepted. On the other hand, considering the statistical 
insignificance of age of investment in specifications (2) and (3), null hypothesis H1.20 is accepted 
and hypothesis H1.2a is rejected. 
                                                 
9 Capital intensity for sample firms has a mean of 47,200 EUR and standard deviation of 155,100 EUR. 
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6.1.2 Returns on DFI portfolio firm 
Table 3 presents the results of regressions of net job creation on change in portfolio firm implied 
returns, i.e. change in firm fair value-to-invested amount ratio (FV/IV ratio growth). In addition to 
basic specification (6), relationship between net job creation and change in firm implied returns is 
controlled for effect of firm size (7), capital intensity (8) and both firm size and capital intensity 
(9) respectively.  
As can be seen from Table 3, returns of DFI investments have statistically significant relationship 
with employment growth in specification (6), where neither effect of firm size nor of firm capital 
intensity is accounted for, and when controlling only for capital intensity (8). When controlling for 
firm size, as in specifications (7) and (9), returns of DFI investments show no explanatory power 
in portfolio firm employment growth even at a 10% confidence interval. 
In specification (6), FV/IV ratio growth is statistically significant at 5% confidence interval and 
can be interpreted as follows; a 10% increase in firm FV/IV ratio is associated with 0.8% higher 
annual employment growth of the firm. After controlling for capital intensity (8), coefficient of 
FV/IV ratio growth is statistically significant only at 10% confidence level and the magnitude of 
the effect also decreases; a 10% increase in firm FV/IV ratio is associated with 0.6% increase in 
employment growth. Considering that FV/IV ratio growth for sample firms is on average 1.2% 
with a standard deviation of 50.7%, even an increase in FV/IV ratio growth of one standard 
deviation would only be associated with a 3.3% increase10 in employment growth. In other words, 
even if the relationship between the returns of DFI portfolio firms and their employment growth is 
statistically significant in some specifications, the relationship is not very meaningful 
economically. 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
10 0.0641 x 0.507 = 0.0325 
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Table 3. Regression results of net employment growth vs. DFI investment returns 
Results of fixed-effects panel regressions of net employment growth (gi,t) on DFI investment 
returns (∆𝐹𝑉/𝐼𝑉𝑖,𝑡), controlling for firm size and firm capital intensity. For all specifications, the 
regression is executed on all sample firms with available data and on the time period from 2008 
to 2014. 
 (6) (7) (8) (9) 
FV/IV ratio growth (%) 0.0786** 
(2.06) 
0.0473 
(1.47) 
0.0641* 
(1.77) 
0.0351 
(1.16) 
Capital intensity   -0.0017*** 
(-5.50) 
-0.0015*** 
(-6.12) 
Firm size     
0-19  1.446*** 
(4.28) 
 1.409*** 
(4.45) 
20-49  0.5822* 
(1.81) 
 0.547* 
(1.82) 
50-99  -0.0037 
(-0.01) 
 -0.0002 
(-0.00) 
100-249  -0.1329 
(-0.43) 
 -0.141 
(-0.49) 
250-499  -0.2744 
(-0.92) 
 -0.275 
(-0.98) 
500-999  -0.390 
(-1.36) 
 -0.390 
(-1.45) 
1000-2499  0.0444 
(0.20) 
 0.0333 
(0.16) 
     
Constant -0.0355 
(-0.75) 
-0.0546 
(-0.20) 
0.0261 
(0.57) 
0.0093 
(0.04) 
Firm fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N (obs) 469 469 468 468 
N (firms) 197 197 196 196 
R-squared 0.0516 0.3588 0.1492 0.4404 
All specified regression equations are computed as fixed effects panel regressions with year dummies. Dependent 
variable for all equations is net employment growth, 𝑔𝑖,𝑡  and base year firm size is used for size classification in all 
equations with size dummies. Base year firm size is measured as firm size in the previous year, i.e. year t – 1. 
𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖,𝑡, is defined as 𝑓𝑖𝑟𝑚 𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑖𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖,𝑡  / 𝐸𝑖,𝑡 where 𝑓𝑖𝑟𝑚 𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑖𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖,𝑡 is the sum of 
cumulative fund investments into firm i at year t and 𝐸𝑖,𝑡 denotes the number of employees in firm i at year t. FV/IV 
ratio growth, i.e. ∆𝐹𝑉/𝐼𝑉𝑖,𝑡 is defined as follows: ∆𝐹𝑉/𝐼𝑉𝑖,𝑡 =  
𝐹𝑉/𝐼𝑉𝑖,𝑡
𝐹𝑉/𝐼𝑉𝑖,𝑡−1
− 1 , where 𝐹𝑉/𝐼𝑉𝑖,𝑡  is FV/IV ratio for firm 
i at year t. FV/IV ratio for firm i at year t is calculated as the ratio of fair valuation of firm i at year t to sum of cumulative 
fund investments into firm i at year t. Firm fair value is an objective, fair value estimate of company value provided 
by the investment fund that has invested into the company and has been prepared in accordance to industry standards 
and regulations. Statistical significance of coefficients is denoted as follows: *P < 0.1; **P < 0.05; ***P < 0.01. 
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More generally, considering the results from Section 6.1.1, and the statistical relationships 
established between firm size, capital intensity and job creation in previous empirical literature (as 
reviewed in Section 2.1) it seems highly likely that specification (9) provides the best empirical 
test on the explanatory power of DFI portfolio firm returns on portfolio firm employment growth. 
This intuition is also supported by the R-squared statistic of 0.4404 for specification (9), which is 
the highest model fit for any of the specifications explaining job creation determinants examined 
in this paper. Based on these considerations, it can be concluded that there is no statistically 
significant relationship between DFI portfolio firm returns and DFI portfolio firm job creation in 
sample firms. Thus, null hypothesis H1.40 is accepted and hypothesis H1.4a is rejected. 
Such conclusion highlights the potential methodological limitations of previous DFI literature, 
which has established a positive relationship between DFI investment returns and investment-level 
job creation (Wilton and Allen, 2012). This is because the analysis performed in this section 
follows strictly the methodology of Haltiwanger et al. (2013) and Rijkers et al. (2014), who provide 
some of the most recent methodological insight into studying firm-level employment growth 
determinants. Thus, this seems to provide strong grounds for questioning the findings of Wilton 
and Allen (2012). It is however worth noting, that as the results presented in this section are 
observed from financial returns of sample DFI investments and not from firm-level profitability 
directly, no explicit conclusions on the potential relationship between firm-level profitability and 
firm-level employment growth in DFI investments can be made. 
6.2 DFI capital infusion and job creation 
6.2.1 Propensity score estimation 
As discussed in Section 5.3, in order to establish a potentially causal relationship between 
additional DFI funding and firm-level employment growth in sample firms, propensity score 
matching (PSM) is used to compare the difference in average employment growth between firms 
receiving additional funding in year t and firms that are characteristically similar, but did not 
receive additional funding in year t. In order to perform the PSM, the probability of each sample 
firm (i.e. propensity score) to receive additional DFI funding during a given year needs to be 
estimated. In this paper, propensity scores are estimated through a logistic regression of a dummy 
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variable, 𝑐𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑖𝑛𝑓𝑢𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖,𝑡
11, which indicates whether a sample firm received additional DFI 
funding during a given year, on a set of observable firm characteristics that explain the difference 
in likelihood of receiving additional DFI funding between firms. These firm characteristics are firm 
size, age of investment, firm sector, 1 year lagged log GDP and 1 year lagged GDP growth. 
Subsequently, the PSM completed using the estimated propensity scores ensures that average 
employment growth is compared between firms that are characteristically most similar, apart from 
the fact of receiving or not receiving additional DFI funding during a given year.  
Table 4 shows the result of a logit regression of 𝑐𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑖𝑛𝑓𝑢𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖,𝑡, against firm size, age of 
investment, firm sector, 1 year lagged log GDP and 1 year lagged GDP growth. Coefficients 
reported for all explanatory variables are in terms of log odds. Specification (1) presents regression 
results using the in-sample model (ISM) and specifications (2) and (3) present results for the out-
of-sample model (OSM). As discussed previously in Section 5.3, the propensity scores are 
estimated using two approaches; in-sample model (ISM) and out-of-sample model (OSM). Both 
approaches involve estimation of logit models on the likelihood of a firm to receive a capital 
infusion during a given year, with the following difference: IS model is estimated using all available 
firm-year observations from the entire firm sample, whereas OS model is estimated using only 
firm-year observations before the year of first funding for additionally funded firms and using all 
available firm-year observations for firms not receiving additional funding. In theory, OSM 
approach should produce a more robust propensity score estimate, as each estimate is built based 
purely on firm characteristics observable ex-ante to any sample firm receiving additional DFI 
funding. Such an approach is more robust, as it eliminates the possibility of some potential 
systematic changes in the specified firm characteristics, which might occur after a sample firm 
receives additional DFI funding, affecting the estimated ex-ante probability of receiving additional 
funding.  
As can be noticed from specification (2), only firm size and financial sector dummy have 
explanatory significance in probability of firm receiving additional funding when estimating using 
the OSM approach. Thus, specification (3) is constructed to perform an out-of-sample regression 
only on variables statistically significant in specification (2) and to be used in further propensity 
score estimation. Also for firm sector, regression equations with sector dummies for each sector 
                                                 
11 See Section 5.3 for exact definition of 𝑐𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑖𝑛𝑓𝑢𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖,𝑡. 
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were estimated separately. These are reported in Table A-1 and Table A-2 in Appendix 1. Results 
presented in the Table A-1 and Table A-2 show that only financial sector has explanatory 
significance for both the ISM and the OSM approach. Thus, regression specifications reported in 
Table 4 only include financial sector dummy and all other sector dummies are dropped.12 
Table 4. Logit regression results on additional DFI funding 
Results of logit regression of 𝑐𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑖𝑛𝑓𝑢𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖,𝑡  on firm size, age of investment, 1 year lagged 
log GDP, 1 year lagged GDP growth and financial sector dummy. Reported coefficients are in 
terms of log odds. For specification (1), the regression is executed on all sample firms with 
available data and on the time period from 2008 to 2014. For specification (2) and (3) the 
regression is executed for firms receiving a capital infusion using only observations from years 
prior to the year when they received their first capital infusion  and for firms not receiving a capital 
infusion using observations from all sample years.  
 In-sample model  Out-of-sample model 
 (1)  (2) (3) 
Firm size  -0.00074** 
(-2.45) 
 -0.00082** 
(-1.96) 
-0.00086** 
(-2.04) 
Age of investment -0.503*** 
(-5.58) 
 -0.117 
(-1.15) 
 
1-yr lag log GDP 0.438*** 
(2.94) 
 0.0014 
(0.01) 
 
1-yr lag GDP g 8.015* 
(1.72) 
 -3.974 
(-0.56) 
 
Firm Sector     
Financial -0.697* 
(-1.91) 
 -1.062* 
(-1.86) 
-1.173** 
(-2.11) 
     
Constant -3.224** 
(-2.46) 
 -0.540 
(-0.25) 
-1.083*** 
(-4.54) 
N (obs) 448  227 235 
LR chi-squared 70.06***  14.38** 13.35*** 
Pseudo R-squared 0.1362  0.0712 0.0652 
All specified regression equations are computed as logit regressions. Dependent variable for all specifications is a 
dummy variable 𝑐𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑖𝑛𝑓𝑢𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖,𝑡, where 𝑐𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑖𝑛𝑓𝑢𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖,𝑡 is assigned a value of 1 for firm i at year t, if change 
in firm total investment for firm i from year t-1 to year t is greater than 0 and is assigned a value of 0 otherwise. 
𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚 𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖,𝑡 is defined as the number of employees for firm i  at year t. Age of investment is defined as the difference 
between the current year, i.e. year t for firm i and the year of initial DFI investment into firm i, i.e. year t – n. 1-yr 
𝑙𝑎𝑔𝑔𝑒𝑑 𝑙𝑜𝑔 𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑗,𝑡  is the natural logarithm of GDP (in nominal US$) of firm domicile country j for firm i at year t-1. 
                                                 
12 Sector dummy variables, which are not statistically significant in both models are dropped for the purpose of 
maintaining comparability between different specifications, for the sake of model simplicity and to make results 
reported in Table 4 as comprehendible as possible. 
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1-yr 𝑙𝑎𝑔𝑔𝑒𝑑 𝐺𝐷𝑃 𝑔𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ𝑗,𝑡 is defined as ∆1𝑦𝑟 𝑙𝑎𝑔𝑔𝑒𝑑 𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑗,𝑡 =  
GDPj,𝑡−1
GDPj,𝑡−2
− 1, where 𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑗,𝑡  is the GDP (in nominal 
US$) of firm domicile country j  for firm i at year t. 𝐹𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑖𝑎𝑙𝑖 is a dummy variable assigned a value of 1 if firm i 
belongs to the financial sector and 0 otherwise. LR chi-squared refers to likelihood-ratio (LR) chi-square test statistic, 
which is a test on joint statistical significance of regression coefficients. Pseudo R-squared refers to McFadden pseudo 
R-squared. Statistical significance of coefficients is denoted as follows: *P < 0.1; **P < 0.05; ***P < 0.01. 
Results of performed logit regression yield several interesting insights. Firstly, as indicated by the 
likelihood-ratio (LR) chi-squared test statistic, for all specifications joint significance of regression 
coefficients is statistically different from zero. This means that all specifications can explain 
probability of sample firm receiving additional DFI funding better than a null model. Firm size has 
a statistically significant and negative relationship with probability of receiving additional DFI 
funding for all specifications. The coefficient for firm size is statistically significant at 5% 
confidence level for all specifications and implies that one standard deviation increase in sample 
firm size as measured in employees, decreases the odds of receiving additional DFI funding by 
about 1.89 to 2.10 times, depending on the used specification.13 This seems to indicate that during 
the sample years Finnfund’s support was skewed more towards SMEs, baring resemblance to 
general investment practices of several other DFIs (see Kingombe et al. 2011). Age of investment 
also has a negative relationship with the probability of receiving additional DFI funding in the IS 
model, but loses its explanatory power in the OS model. In the ISM specification, for every 
additional year passed from the DFI initial investment, sample firm is 1.65 times less likely14 to 
receive additional DFI funding. This is in-line with the intuition outlined in Section 5.3. 
1-yr lagged log GDP and 1-yr lagged GDP growth are both positively associated with the 
likelihood of firm receiving additional DFI funding in the IS model. This is an expected result 
considering the widely recognized link between GDP and GDP growth and FDI in economic 
literature (e.g. Schneider and Frey, 1985 and Tsai, 1994). For one unit increase in 𝑙𝑜𝑔 𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑗,𝑡 in 
year t-1 for firm i domiciled in country j the likelihood of firm i receiving additional DFI funding 
increases by about 1.55 times15. Similarly, 1% increase in GDP growth increases the likelihood of 
                                                 
13 Standard deviation of firm size is 863 employees. Converting firm size coefficient for (1) from log odds to odds ratio: 
𝑒−0.00074 𝑥 863 = 0.528 more likely to receive additional funding. This is equal to 0.528 / 1 = 1.89 less likely to receive 
additional funding. Similary, for specification (2):   : 𝑒−0.00082 𝑥 863 = 0.493 / 1 = 2.03 and for specification (3): 
𝑒−0.00086 𝑥 863 = 0.476 / 1 = 2.1 
14 𝑒−0.503= 0.605 / 1 = 1.654 
15 𝑒0.438= 1.550 
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receiving additional DFI funding by about 1.08 times16. However, as shown by specification (2), 
both level and growth of GDP lose their predictive power of additional DFI funding when using 
the OSM approach. Thus, both 1-yr lagged log GDP and 1-yr lagged GDP growth are dropped 
from specification (3), which is the OSM specification used in eventual propensity score 
estimation. Lastly, belonging to financial sector decreases the probability of sample firm to receive 
additional DFI funding by about 2.01 times17 in the IS model and by about 3.23 times18 in the OS 
model. In addition to firm size, financial sector dummy is the only other variable to have a 
statistically significant coefficient in both ISM and OSM specifications. As there was no other 
expectation on the relationship between firm sector and the probability of sample firm to receive 
additional DFI funding, apart from there being a difference across sectors, the estimated coefficient 
seems to make economic sense. 
All in all, logit regressions presented in Table 4 seem to yield results that are meaningful and in-
line with general economic intuition. This suggests that the presented specifications are well-suited 
for estimating propensity scores for sample firms. Table 5 shows summary statistics for the 
propensity scores estimated using both the ISM and the OSM approach. ISM propensity scores are 
estimated using specification (1) and OSM propensity scores using specification (3), as mentioned 
earlier. The estimated propensity scores are used for subsequent propensity score matching and 
treatment effects analysis, as reported in Section 6.2.2. Figure 7 shows the cumulative distribution 
of estimated propensity scores for both estimation approaches.  
Both in Table 5 and in Figure 7, treated group refers to firm-year observations of sample firms that 
received additional DFI funding during the time period of 2008 to 2014 and control group refers 
to firm-year observations of sample firms that did not received additional DFI funding during 2008 
to 2014. Reported propensity scores can be interpreted as the probability of a sample firm to receive 
additional DFI funding during the sample year, based on observed values for specified firm 
characteristics. These specified firm characteristics are firm size, age of investment, firm sector 
(financial), 1 year lagged log GDP and 1 year lagged GDP growth for the ISM approach and firm 
size and firm sector (financial) for the OSM approach. 
                                                 
16 𝑒
8.015
100 = 1.083 
17 𝑒−0.697= 2.008 
18 𝑒−1.173= 3.232 
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Table 5. Summary statistics of estimated propensity scores 
Summary statistics of propensity scores estimated using both out-of-sample and in-sample 
estimation approaches. Treated group reports propensity scores for firm-year observations of 
sample firms that received additional DFI funding during the time period of 2008 to 2014. Control 
group reports propensity scores for firm-year observations of sample firms that did not receive 
additional DFI funding during 2008 to 2014. 
 In-sample model 
 
Out-of-sample model 
 
N 
(obs) 
Mean Median Min Max 
 N 
(obs) 
Mean Median Min Max 
Propensity 
score 
(treated) 
117 0.37 0.38 0.05 0.74 
 
122 0.21 0.23 0.02 0.25 
Propensity 
score 
(control) 
331 0.22 0.21 0.00 0.62 
 
340 0.17 0.21 0.00 0.25 
 
Figure 7. Cumulative distribution of estimated propensity scores for by firm category and 
estimation approach 
Estimated propensity scores shown for treated and control firms for both ISM and OSM estimation 
approach. Treated group reports propensity scores for firm-year observations of sample firms that 
received additional DFI funding during the time period of 2008 to 2014. Control group reports 
propensity scores for firm-year observations of sample firms that did not receive additional DFI 
funding during 2008 to 2014. 
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As discussed earlier in Section 6.2.1, the OSM approach should in theory estimate more robust 
propensity scores for the ex-ante probability of receiving a capital infusion than the ISM approach. 
However, both the cumulative distribution of propensity scores for sample firms, as well as 
summary statistics indicate that the OSM approach produces significantly lower propensity scores 
compared to estimates produced with the ISM approach. This is evident when examining average 
estimated propensity scores for sample firms produced by the two approaches, which are 0.16 
higher for the treated group and 0.05 higher for the control group when estimated using the ISM 
approach. Also with the ISM approach, over 40% of sample propensity scores are above 0.2 for 
the control group and above 0.4 for the treated group, while for the OSM approach less than 10% 
of sample propensity scores are above 0.2 for both groups. This means that specification (1) does 
a better job than specification (3) at explaining and quantifying the difference in probability of 
sample firm to receive additional funding, based on observable sample firm characteristics. Thus, 
propensity scores estimated using both specification (1) and (3) are used in propensity score 
matching performed in the next section, to provide a methodologically most holistic approach to 
examine the treatment effect19 of additional DFI funding present in the sample.  
6.2.2 Treatment effects analysis 
Table 6 shows results of treatment effects analysis on net employment growth (%) during year t 
for firms receiving additional DFI funding during year t (i.e. treated group) and for firms not 
receiving additional DFI funding during year t (i.e. control group), for all sample periods t. First 
row of the table reports differences in the average net employment growth (𝑔𝑖,𝑡) for the treated and 
control firm-year observations, without employing any matching procedures. Rest of the table 
reports differences in average 𝑔𝑖,𝑡 for the treated and control firm-year observations, where control 
firm-year observations are selected using the i) nearest neighbor matching (NNM) and ii) Kernel 
matching algorithm. NNM is performed in its simplest form, as one-to-one matching20, where a 
treated firm-year observation is assigned a matching control firm-year observation based on the 
                                                 
19 Treatment effect refers to the difference in annual employment growth between treated firms (i.e. firms receiving 
additional DFI funding in yeat t) and matched control firms (i.e. characteristically similar firms that did not receive 
additional DFI funding in year t). In other words, “treatment effects” refers to the effect additional DFI funding has 
on sample firm employment growth. 
20 Also known as k nearest neighbor (KNN) matching, with k = 1. 
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nearest propensity score (following Rubin, 1973). Kernel matching is performed following 
specifications Imai and Azam (2012), with a bandwidth of 0.05. In the Kernel matching algorithm, 
each treated firm-year observation is compared against a weighted average of multiple control firm-
year observations, where assigned weights are defined by the distance of propensity scores between 
the given control observation and the treated observation.21 As mentioned in previous section, both 
an ISM and an OSM approach is used to estimate two separate sets of propensity scores for sample 
firm-year observations. Thus, propensity score matching and subsequent examination of 
differences in average 𝑔𝑖,𝑡 between the treated and control firm-year observations are reported 
separately for ISM and OSM, as they result in different treated and control groups. 
Table 6. Treatment effects analysis of additional DFI funding 
Analysis of average treatment effect (ATT) of additional DFI funding (𝑐𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑖𝑛𝑓𝑢𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖,𝑡)  on 
net employment growth (𝑔𝑖,𝑡). Results reported for unmatched, nearest neighbor matched (NNM) 
and Kernel matched sample firm-year observations. For all groups, average treatment effects 
calculated using observations from all sample firms with available data and for the time period of 
2008 to 2014. 
 Mean 𝑔𝑖,𝑡    N(obs) 
Matching algorithm Treated Control ATT T-stat Treated Control 
Unmatched 0.1357 0.0471 0.0886** 2.13 127 355 
NNM (ISM) 0.1456 -0.0233 0.1689** 2.12 102 315 
NNM (OSM) 0.1319 0.0527 0.0792 1.21 115 324 
Kernel (ISM) 0.1456 0.0445 0.1011* 1.70 102 315 
Kernel (OSM) 0.1319 0.0466 0.0853* 1.65 115 324 
Matching algorithm refers to the propensity score matching algorithm used for selection of treated and control group 
firm-year observations. Treated group reports average 𝑔𝑖,𝑡  for firm-year observations of sample firms that received 
additional DFI funding during the time period of 2008 to 2014 and qualified for matching against a control group using 
the specified matching algorithm. Control group reports average 𝑔𝑖,𝑡 for firm-year observations of sample firms that 
did not receive additional DFI funding during 2008 to 2014 and are matched to treated group using the specified 
matching algorithm. ATT reports the difference in average 𝑔𝑖,𝑡 between treated and control group, where firm-year 
observations are selected into both groups using the specified matching algorithm. T-stat reports the t-statistic of ATT. 
Statistical significance of coefficients is denoted as follows: *P < 0.1; **P < 0.05; ***P < 0.01 
Comparing average net employment growth for unmatched treated and control observations 
                                                 
21 See Heckman et al. (1998) for technical details on Kernel matching algorithm. 
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indicates a statistically significant difference between the two groups. Average annual net 
employment growth for sample firms receiving additional DFI funding seems to be 8.9% higher 
than for firms not receiving additional DFI funding. However, as discussed in Section 5.3, such a 
naïve analysis is problematic due to potential endogeneity issues. For instance, portfolio firms with 
strong economic and employment growth ex-ante are probably more likely to receive additional 
DFI funding in the first place. Thus no meaningful inferences can be drawn from simply examining 
the difference in average net employment growth between the treated and control group.  
Comparing group differences using the nearest neighbor and Kernel matching procedures resolves 
endogeneity issues and provides a more robust analysis of effect of additional DFI funding on 
average 𝑔𝑖,𝑡, as it accounts for firm characteristics that increase the likelihood of receiving 
additional DFI funding by comparing treated firm-year observations with characteristically most 
similar non-treated (control) firm-year observations. To ensure the quality of matching for both 
matching algorithms, the balancing property of the explanatory variables used in propensity score 
estimation, is tested for each matching algorithm reported in Table 6. Essentially, this is a test on 
whether matched firm-year observations in the treatment and control groups are statistically 
comparable, as it examines whether explanatory variables used to predict propensity scores for 
each firm-year observation are similar for both groups. In practice, the balancing test is performed 
by computing mean values of each explanatory variable used in propensity score estimation (see 
Section 6.2.1 for details on explanatory variables used in estimating propensity scores) and 
comparing the differences in these mean values between treated and control groups, where firm-
year observations are selected into treated and control groups using the specified matching 
algorithm.   
Table 7 reports results of the balancing test for each propensity score matching algorithm used in 
the treatment effects analysis. As can be seen from the table, none of the used matching algorithms 
exhibit a statistically significant difference in mean values of observable firm characteristics 
between the treated and matched control group observations. This indicates that the treated and 
control groups are similar enough in all of the matching cases in order to make meaningful 
comparisons between average 𝑔𝑖,𝑡 of treated and control groups.  
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Table 7. Balancing test on explanatory variables used in NN and Kernel matching 
Balancing test on explanatory variables used estimation of propensity scores and subsequent 
propensity score matching using nearest neighbor and Kernel matching algorithms. Treated group 
includes firm-year observations of sample firms that received additional DFI funding during the 
time period of 2008 to 2014 and qualified for matching against a control group using the specified 
matching algorithm. Control includes firm-year observations of sample firms that did not receive 
additional DFI funding during 2008 to 2014 and are matched to treated group using the specified 
matching algorithm. 
 Mean  
 Treated Control T-stat 
NNM (ISM)    
Firm size  231.53 275.26 -0.73 
Age of investment 2.21 2.11 0.57 
1-yr lag GDP 7.90 7.98 -0.61 
1-yr lag GDP g 4.92% 4.56% 0.89 
Firm sector (financial) 0.07 0.10 -0.76 
NNM (OSM)    
Firm size 239.78 264.78 -0.49 
Firm sector (financial) 0.08 0.06 0.52 
Kernel (ISM)    
Firm size  231.53 243.71 -0.25 
Age of investment 2.21 2.22 -0.10 
1-yr lag GDP 7.90 7.94 -0.30 
1-yr lag GDP g 4.92% 4.97% -0.11 
Firm sector (financial) 0.07 0.10 -0.72 
Kernel (OSM)    
Firm size  239.78 257.14 -0.33 
Firm sector (financial) 0.08 0.08 0.06 
𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚 𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖,𝑡 is defined as the number of employees for firm i  at year t. Age of investment is defined as the difference 
between the current year, i.e. year t for firm i and the year of initial DFI investment into firm i, i.e. year t – n. 1-yr 
𝑙𝑎𝑔𝑔𝑒𝑑 𝑙𝑜𝑔 𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑗,𝑡  is the natural logarithm of GDP (in nominal US$) of firm domicile country j for firm i at year t-1. 
1-yr 𝑙𝑎𝑔𝑔𝑒𝑑 𝐺𝐷𝑃 𝑔𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ𝑗,𝑡 is defined as ∆1𝑦𝑟 𝑙𝑎𝑔𝑔𝑒𝑑 𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑗,𝑡 =  
GDPj,𝑡−1
GDPj,𝑡−2
− 1, where 𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑗,𝑡  is the GDP (in nominal 
US$) of firm domicile country j  for firm i at year t. 𝐹𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑖𝑎𝑙𝑖 is a dummy variable assigned a value of 1 if firm i 
belongs to the financial sector and 0 otherwise. Statistical significance of coefficients is denoted as follows: *P < 0.1; 
**P < 0.05; ***P < 0.01. 
Treatment effects analysis with both NNM and Kernel procedures, as reported in Table 6, yields 
exiting results. Firstly, NNM using ISM estimated propensity scores shows a statistically 
significant and positive effect of additional DFI funding on sample firm employment growth. On 
average, receiving additional DFI funding during year t increased net employment growth for firm 
46 
 
i during year t by 16.9%. In other words, DFI investee firms receiving additional DFI funding 
experience a 16.9% boost in same year employment growth compared to DFI investee firms of 
very similar size, sector, time since inclusion in DFI portfolio and domicile country 
macroeconomic conditions, but who do not receive such funding. When propensity scores for 
NNM are estimated using the OSM approach, the employment effect of additional DFI funding is 
7.9%, but statistically insignificant even at 10% confidence level. Interestingly, the difference in 
average annual employment growth between treated and control groups (ATT) is greater in the 
case of NNM ISM matching than in the unmatched case. This would imply that rather than the 
likelihood of receiving DFI funding being biased towards firms who have shown strong economic 
and employment growth in the past, the relationship is actually quite the opposite. Considering that 
the control group of NNM (ISM) exhibited -2.3% average annual employment growth, compared 
to 4.7% average annual employment growth of the unmatched control group, it seems that 
additional DFI funding was actually channeled more towards struggling firms or the firms with 
highest unexplored employment growth potential.  
Comparing differences in average annual employment growth between treated and control firm-
year observations using the Kernel matching procedure yields results of similar nature, but of 
smaller magnitude than with the NNM (ISM) method. Average annual employment effect of 
receiving additional DFI funding was 10.1% when using ISM propensity score estimates for 
matching of sample firms and 8.5% when using OSM propensity score estimates. In both cases, 
ATT is statistically significant at 10% confidence intervals. Key driver behind the smaller 
magnitude of ATT when compared to NNM (ISM) approach, is that the average annual 
employment growth for the control group using the Kernel matching method is much closer to 
average annual employment growth of the unmatched control group. Results of Kernel matching 
would thus suggest that even though characteristically similar sample firms to those who receive 
additional DFI funding exhibit positive average annual employment growth even without 
additional funding, their average annual employment growth is substantially boosted (by about 
8.5% to 10.1%) by the act of funding. Also considering that the average annual employment growth 
for the entire firm sample is 8.5% and median annual employment growth is 5.7% (see Table 1, 
Section 4.2), the interpretation and magnitude of the results yielded using the Kernel matching 
method seem more plausible than for the NNM (ISM) method.  
All in all, results of the treatment effects analysis provide strong grounds to believe that DFI 
47 
 
funding has a statistically significant, positive effect on firm-level employment growth in DFI 
investments. Though NNM and Kernel approaches produce results of slightly differing magnitude 
and statistical significance, in both cases the average annual net employment growth for firms 
receiving additional DFI funding is higher and distinctly different from their control groups. Thus, 
hypothesis H2a is accepted and null-hypothesis H20 is rejected. 
6.2.3 Sensitivity discussion and further robustness checks 
First potential methodological robustness issue is encountered when examining the dispersion of 
propensity scores for the OSM approach, as described in Table 5 and shown in Figure 7 (see Section 
6.2.2). Maximum propensity score for both treated and control firms across the entire sample is 
just slightly above 0.25, which indicates that specification (3), as defined in the previous section, 
only at best predicts with a 25% accuracy whether firm i will or will not receive a capital infusion 
at year t. This methodological limitation is primarily driven by a rather limited availability of 
different firm descriptive variables in the Finnfund dataset. As no other databases could be 
combined with the Finnfund dataset due to data consistency issues, a rather limited amount of firm 
descriptive variables could be used as explanatory variables in estimating the probability of firm 
receiving or not receiving a capital infusion during a given year. As discussed earlier (see Section 
6.2.2), this methodological challenge is tackled by also using the ISM approach in propensity score 
estimation and subsequent propensity score matching (PSM). 
Another typical criticism towards the PSM method, specifically related to panel data, is that 
unobservable time-varying characteristics might affect the outcome of a treatment effects analysis 
(Imai and Azam, 2012). However, considering that amongst sample firms there was no one fixed 
“treatment year” when sample firms might have or might not have received additional DFI funding, 
it seems justified to assume a random distribution of 𝑐𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑖𝑛𝑓𝑢𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖,𝑡 across time. Assuming a 
random distribution of 𝑐𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑖𝑛𝑓𝑢𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖,𝑡 across time allows to observe the effect of 
𝑐𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑖𝑛𝑓𝑢𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖,𝑡 on the outcome variable (𝑔𝑖,𝑡) without worrying that potential, time-varying 
and unobservable characteristics of 𝑐𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑖𝑛𝑓𝑢𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖,𝑡 might have an effect on 𝑔𝑖,𝑡. 
 However, even in the presence of such time-randomization of the “treatment variable” some 
studies might choose to perform alternative analyses to PSM as robustness checks of previous’ 
findings. An approach typically used with panel data is a difference-in-difference propensity score 
matching (DID-PSM), as outlined for instance by Smith and Todd (2005) and Imai and Azam 
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(2012). Essentially, this method involves taking the first difference of the outcome variable from 
t-1 to t, where treatment takes place at t for treated group and compare it with a first differenced 
outcome variable of a propensity score matched control observation, where the control has not 
received treatment at t. 
This same analysis is performed below, but differently to the propensity score matching in Section 
6.2, only first capital infusions received by sample firms are considered. This decision is made, 
because standard deviation of 𝑔𝑖,𝑡  is significantly higher for firm-year observations during which 
sample firms receive additional DFI funding (see Table A-3, Appendix 2). When differencing a 
growth variable (i.e. in this case, first difference of 𝑔𝑖,𝑡  is the growth of net employment growth 
defined as 𝑔𝑖,𝑡 − 𝑔𝑖,𝑡−1) extreme fluctuations of outcome variable can occur. Thus, in order to 
minimize the effect that increased volatility of 𝑔𝑖,𝑡 which follows after receiving additional DFI 
funding, has on the observed differences in 𝑔𝑖,𝑡 − 𝑔𝑖,𝑡−1 between treated and control firm-year 
observations, it seems most appropriate to examine the employment effect of only the first capital 
infusion received by a firm i during years 2008 to 2014. 
Table 8 presents the results of DID-PSM analysis following approaches of Smith and Todd (2005) 
and Imai and Azam (2012). The analysis examines the effect of a first additional DFI funding 
round, potentially received by firm i during years 2008 to 2014, on average growth in annual 
employment growth of firm i. Matching is performed using nearest neighbor one-to-one 
matching.22 Similarly to Section 6.2.2, test on balancing property of explanatory variables is 
performed and indicates no statistically significant difference for any of the explanatory variables 
between the treated and control firm-year observations (see Table A-4, Appendix 2 for further 
details). 
As can be clearly seen from Table 8, including only the first capital infusions received by a firm in 
the analysis significantly decreases the sample size of both treated and control firm-year 
observations. Taking the first difference of net employment growth also dramatically changes the 
nature of the outcome variable, as average growth of annual employment growth is negative both 
for the treated and the control group. While this result may seem surprising at first, considering the 
established negative relationship between firm size and employment growth, both in this study and 
                                                 
22 Similarly as in Section 6.2.2, both NNM and Kernel matching was performed. However, due to high similar results 
and in order to keep the analysis concise, only NNM results are reported below. 
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in empirical literature more generally, the observed relationship becomes intuitive. If a firm 
experiences positive employment growth, as is the case with sample firms of this study on average, 
the pace of firm employment growth is bound to decrease over time as firm size increases. 
Table 8. DID-PSM treatment effects analysis of first capital infusion effect 
Analysis of average treatment effect (ATT) of additional DFI funding (𝑐𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑖𝑛𝑓𝑢𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖,𝑡)  on 
first difference of net employment growth (𝑔𝑖,𝑡 − 𝑔𝑖,𝑡−1). Results reported for unmatched and NN 
matched. For all groups, average treatment effects estimated using all available observations from 
all sample firms for the time period of 2008 to 2014. 
 Mean (𝑔𝑖,𝑡-𝑔𝑖,𝑡−1)   N(obs) 
Matching algorithm Treated Control ATT T-stat Treated Control 
Unmatched -0.0184 -0.0673 0.0489 0.76 18 116 
NNM (ISM) -0.0181 -0.170 0.1516 1.07 16 105 
NNM (OSM) -0.0156 -0.2623 0.2467 1.34 17 108 
Matching algorithm refers to the propensity score matching algorithm used for selection of treated and control group 
firm-year observations. Treated group reports average 𝑔𝑖,𝑡  for firm-year observations of sample firms that received 
additional DFI funding during the time period of 2008 to 2014 and qualified for matching against a control group using 
the specified matching algorithm. Control group reports average 𝑔𝑖,𝑡 for firm-year observations of sample firms that 
did not receive additional DFI funding during 2008 to 2014 and are matched to treated group using the specified 
matching algorithm. ATT reports the difference in average 𝑔𝑖,𝑡 between treated and control group, where firm-year 
observations are selected into both groups using the specified matching algorithm. T-stat reports the t-statistic of ATT. 
Statistical significance of coefficients is denoted as follows: *P < 0.1; **P < 0.05; ***P < 0.01 
Interestingly, even though average growth of annual employment growth is negative across sample 
firms, additional DFI funding seems to have a positive effect on average 𝑔𝑖,𝑡 − 𝑔𝑖,𝑡−1 for sample 
firms. This is indicated by a positive, if statistically insignificant, difference in average 𝑔𝑖,𝑡 − 𝑔𝑖,𝑡−1 
between treated and control firms (ATT) for both NNM approaches. Even though statistically 
insignificant, the observed positive difference in average 𝑔𝑖,𝑡 − 𝑔𝑖,𝑡−1 between treated and control 
firm-year observations suggests that additional DFI funding is potentially capable of slowing down 
the decreasing pace of annual employment growth for sample firms - and as indicated by the 
magnitude of the difference, at a potentially quite substantial pace. Statistical insignificance of the 
ATT is highly likely attributable to the small sample size of the DID-PSM analysis. The sample 
size is limited primarily by the small number of employment growth observations available for 
sample firms before receiving their first capital infusion. Taking the first difference of the limited 
number of such outcome variable observations then further decreased the sample size.  
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To sum up, it is difficult to draw explicit conclusions from the DID-PSM analysis performed 
following Imai and Azam (2012) on how first instances of additional DFI funding effect growth of 
sample firm annual employment growth (𝑔𝑖,𝑡 − 𝑔𝑖,𝑡−1). Even though observed differences between 
treated and matched control observations indicate on DFI funding having a positive effect on the 
otherwise decreasing average pace of annual employment growth of sample firms, the sample 
available for the analysis is small and observed differences statistically insignificant.  
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7. Conclusion and discussion 
7.1 General findings 
The aim of this study was to gain a better understanding on the job creation dynamics that occur in 
investee firms of development finance institutions. More specifically, the goal was to examine how 
investment-level characteristics of DFI investments, such as firm size, firm age, firm capital 
intensity and investment returns are related to job creation of these investments. In addition, the 
effect of DFI funding itself on firm-level employment growth was studied, by comparing average 
employment growth of DFI investee firms receiving additional DFI funding to employment growth 
of matched DFI investee firms not receiving additional funding. With regards to this, the study has 
established several interesting results both in context of firm-level job creation and general DFI-
related literature. The key conclusions from the empirical results of the study and their implications 
are summarized in Figure 8. 
Figure 8. Summary of key conclusions and research implications based on the empirical 
results of the study 
 
Firstly, examining firm-level determinants of employment growth in DFI portfolio firms, a 
negative relationship for both firm size and capital intensity with firm-level employment growth in 
DFI investments is established. Both relationships are economically meaningful and in line with 
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theoretical and empirical literature on firm-level employment growth determinants, but have not 
been previously tested with a sample of DFI portfolio companies. For instance, Davis et al. (1996), 
Neumark et al. (2011), Haltiwanger et al. (2013), Rijkers et al. (2014) and Ayyagri et al. (2016) 
establish a negative relationship between firm size and employment growth in both developed and 
developing countries. A negative relationship between firm capital intensity and employment 
growth is on the other hand predicted by the capital-labor substitution relationship of the basic 
Cobb-Douglas production function (Cobb and Douglas, 1928). However, unlike Haltiwanger et al. 
(2013) or Rijkers et al. (2014), no statistically significant relationship between firm age and 
employment growth is found in this paper. While this might suggest that firm age is not a significant 
determinant of employment growth for sample DFI investee firms, the observed statistical 
insignificance is most likely related to the problematic firm age proxy used in this paper. 
More interestingly, this paper finds no statistically significant relationship between returns of DFI 
investments and their firm-level employment growth, after controlling for firm size and capital 
intensity. This parts from previous findings of DFI practitioner literature, which not controlling for 
these well-established firm-level employment growth determinants has found a positive 
relationship between returns from DFI investments and investment-level job creation (Wilton and 
Allen, 2012).  Considering that the empirical work in this study follows closely some of the most 
recent methodological approaches outlined in studying firm-level employment growth 
determinants, i.e. Haltiwanger et al. (2013) and Rijkers et al. (2014), the results provide strong 
grounds to question the findings of Wilton and Allen (2012). As the existence of a positive link 
between returns from DFI investments and investment-level job creation seems to have established 
itself as a widely accepted truth in discussion surrounding the DFI industry, findings of this paper 
have significant importance. It is however worth noting, that as the results are observed from 
financial returns of sample DFI investments and not from firm-level profitability directly, results 
of this paper do not allow to make any explicit conclusions on the potential relationship between 
firm-level profitability and firm-level employment growth in DFI investments. 
Secondly, additional DFI funding is found to positively and statistically significantly effect firm-
level employment growth in sample firms. By matching 96 Finnfund investments that received 
additional funding during the years 2008 to 2014 with a group of control investments not receiving 
additional funding through a PSM procedure, a statistically positive effect of additional funding on 
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average annual employment growth is established. This is the first paper to document such a micro-
level relationship between DFI funding and firm-level job creation. 
The employment effect of DFI funding is examined, by matching firm-year observations during 
which a sample firm received funding, against control observations where sample firm has 
otherwise similar firm characteristics to the funded firm, but does not receive funding during the 
given year. Matching is performed based on sample firm propensity scores, which are estimated 
using two different approaches and are subsequently matched using two different matching 
algorithms; nearest neighbor one-to-one matching (NNM) and Kernel matching. The statistical 
significance of the employment effect of DFI funding persists across all methodologies, apart from 
the case of NNM using out-of-sample estimated propensity scores. Also, while the performed 
robustness check using a DID-PSM approach following Imai and Azam (2012) yields somewhat 
inconclusive results, the general trend in direction and magnitude of the results observed across all 
the methodologies strongly suggests that additional DFI funding has a positive effect on firm-level 
job creation. Considering these empirical findings in parallel to financial and non-financial benefits 
associated with DFI funding, as proposed by both DFI literature (e.g. Kingombe et al., 2011, te 
Velde and Massa, 2011 and Joujean and te Velde, 2013) and by applicable VC literature (e.g. Large 
and Muegge, 2008 and Balboa et al. 2011), there are also good theoretical grounds to believe that 
DFI funding has a beneficial effect on firm-level employment growth. Lastly, if one assumes that 
comparing the employment effect of additional DFI funding against characteristically similar non-
funded DFI investments is similar to examining the firm-level employment effect of DFI funding 
more generally, findings of this paper can to some extent be generalized to consider the 
employment effect of DFI funding on firms previously not backed by DFIs. 
While the study design does not allow to examine separately whether financial or non-financial 
benefits affect the firm-level employment growth of sample firms, some speculation can still be 
made. One exciting characteristic of the results from the DFI funding effect analysis is that 
additional DFI funding is found to increase employment growth rate (%), not merely the absolute 
number of jobs.23 As both this paper and previous literature on employment growth determinants 
have established a negative relationship between firm size and employment growth, finding a 
positive effect of funding on employment growth rate (%) provides a strong argument against the 
                                                 
23 The outcome variable for all regressions examining employment growth, apart from the DID-PSM analysis, is net 
employment growth (%) as defined by 𝑔𝑖,𝑡 - not the change in absolute number of employees (#). 
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intuition that purely expansionary activity of the firm, due to availability of new financial capital, 
could increase the rate at which a firm creates jobs. In other words, because rate of employment 
growth should slow down as firm grows, DFI funding is highly likely to increase employment 
growth of investee firms through some other channel than purely provision of additional financial 
resources for firm growth. This insight is also supported by the results of DID-PSM analysis, which 
shows a positive effect of additional DFI funding on the growth of average employment growth. 
Also, as the effect of DFI funding is studied on net employment growth of the same year t, it seems 
likely that a significant part of the effect could be driven by non-financial benefits of DFI funding. 
Recruitment and firm expansion are known to be time consuming processes and considering that 
the additional funding is not necessarily occurring at the start of year t, this would leave sample 
firms with rather short time to expand purely on the basis of received new capital. A more likely 
explanation is that a DFI is paying higher attention already before year t to investee firms that are 
candidates for additional funding and is providing managerial guidance and technical assistance to 
such firms. Thus at year t, when a decision on providing additional funding is made, firms who end 
up getting funded are already in good shape and growing due to DFI non-financial services received 
prior to year t. This makes some of the exhibited employment growth at year t traceable to the non-
financial benefits received prior to year t and explains the “quickness” of the effect of additional 
DFI funding on firm employment growth. To summarize, it seems likely that a significant part of 
the employment effect of DFI funding is driven by non-financial benefits of DFI funding, because 
the employment effect is observable so quickly in sample firms. 
7.2 Suggestions for further research 
Considering that empirical literature documents a wide range of firm-level employment 
determinants, very few of which have been examined in context of DFI investments, there are 
numerous interesting opportunities for further research. Veldhuis et al. (2013) provide an excellent 
review of recent research on firm-level employment growth determinants, documenting several 
empirical studies establishing links between e.g. firm export orientation and innovation ability and 
firm employment growth. Studying how these relationships hold in the context of DFI investee 
firms would significantly increase our knowledge of the job creation dynamics in DFI investments.  
With regards to the effect of DFI funding on firm-level employment growth, it would be exciting 
to see a study that examines employment growth of DFI backed firms against a matched group of 
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control firms that have never received DFI investments. Such analysis would provide significantly 
stronger grounds to conclude, whether a positive employment effect of DFI funding exists also 
outside the context of DFI investee firms, in the general firm population.  
Lastly, a study examining separately how the financial and non-financial benefits of DFI backing 
potentially affect employment growth would lead to a far better understanding of the mechanisms 
underlying the causality established in this paper. Such research could be performed in similar 
manner to e.g. Jääskeläinen (2006) and Balboa et al. (2011), who look at how the total number of 
portfolio companies managed by a VC investment manager relates to the performance of portfolio 
companies under his or her management. In this case, the number of portfolio companies per 
investment manager acts as a proxy for investment manager’s attention and thus for the amount of 
non-financial benefits provided by the VC, allowing to examine the effect of non-financial benefits 
directly. 
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A. Appendices 
Appendix 1. 
Table A-1 
Results of logit regression of 𝑐𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑖𝑛𝑓𝑢𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖,𝑡  on firm size, age of investment, 1 year lagged 
log GDP,1 year lagged GDP growth and all sector dummies. Reported coefficients are in terms 
of log odds. Regression is executed on all sample firms with available data and on the time period 
from 2008 to 2014.  
 In-sample model 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Firm size  -0.00074** 
(-2.45) 
-0.00080*** 
(-2.63) 
-0.00089*** 
(-2.84) 
-0.00085*** 
(-2.74) 
Age of investment -0.503*** 
(-5.58) 
-0.509*** 
(-5.59) 
-0.516*** 
(-5.65) 
-0.565*** 
(-5.65) 
1-yr lag log GDP 0.438*** 
(2.94) 
0.383*** 
(2.57) 
0.425*** 
(2.91) 
0.457*** 
(3.11) 
1-yr lag GDP g 8.015* 
(1.72) 
8.825* 
(1.90) 
7.866* 
(1.71) 
7.412 
(1.60) 
Firm Sector     
Financial -0.697* 
(-1.91) 
   
Infrastructure  0.704*** 
(2.66) 
  
Manuf & Serv   -0.478* 
(-1.94) 
 
Agribusiness    0.468 
(1.43) 
     
Constant -3.224** 
(-2.46) 
-3.104** 
(-2.41) 
-2.950** 
(-2.28) 
-3.461*** 
(-2.69) 
N (obs) 448 448 448 448 
LR chi-squared 70.06*** 73.04*** 69.86*** 68.03*** 
Pseudo R-squared 0.1362 0.1419 0.1358 0.1322 
All specified regression equations are computed as logit regressions. Dependent variable for all specifications is a 
dummy variable 𝑐𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑖𝑛𝑓𝑢𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖,𝑡, where 𝑐𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑖𝑛𝑓𝑢𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖,𝑡 is assigned a value of 1 for firm i at year t, if change 
in firm total investment for firm i from year t-1 to year t is greater than 0 and is assigned a value of 0 otherwise. 
𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚 𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖,𝑡 is defined as the number of employees for firm i  at year t. Age of investment is defined as the difference 
between the current year, i.e. year t for firm i and the year of initial DFI investment into firm i, i.e. year t – n. 1-yr 
𝑙𝑎𝑔𝑔𝑒𝑑 𝑙𝑜𝑔 𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑗,𝑡  is the natural logarithm of GDP (in nominal US$) of firm domicile country j for firm i at year t-1. 
1-yr 𝑙𝑎𝑔𝑔𝑒𝑑 𝐺𝐷𝑃 𝑔𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ𝑗,𝑡 is defined as ∆1𝑦𝑟 𝑙𝑎𝑔𝑔𝑒𝑑 𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑗,𝑡 =  
GDPj,𝑡−1
GDPj,𝑡−2
− 1, where 𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑗,𝑡  is the GDP (in nominal 
US$) of firm domicile country j  for firm i at year t. 𝐹𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑖𝑎𝑙𝑖 is a dummy variable assigned a value of 1 if firm i 
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belongs to the financial sector and 0 otherwise. 𝐼𝑛𝑓𝑟𝑎𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑢𝑐𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑖 is a dummy variable assigned a value of 1 if firm i 
belongs to the infrastructure or utilities sector and 0 otherwise. 𝑀𝑎𝑛𝑢𝑓 & 𝑆𝑒𝑟𝑣𝑖 is a dummy variable assigned a value 
of 1 if firm i belongs to the manufacturing or services sector and 0 otherwise. 𝐴𝑔𝑟𝑖𝑏𝑢𝑠𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑖 is a dummy variable 
assigned a value of 1 if firm i belongs to the agribusiness sector and 0 otherwise.LR chi-squared refers to likelihood-
ratio (LR) chi-square test statistic, which is a test on joint statistical significance of regression coefficients. Pseudo R-
squared refers to McFadden pseudo R-squared. Statistical significance of coefficients is denoted as follows:  
*P < 0.1; **P < 0.05; ***P < 0.01. 
 
Table A-2 
Results of logit regression of 𝑐𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑖𝑛𝑓𝑢𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖,𝑡  on firm size, age of investment, 1 year lagged 
log GDP,1 year lagged GDP growth and all sector dummies. Reported coefficients are in terms 
of log odds. Regression is executed for firms receiving a capital infusion using only observations 
from years prior to the year when they received their first capital infusion and for firms not 
receiving a capital infusion on the time period from 2008 to 2014. 
 Out-of-sample model 
 (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Firm size  -0.00082** 
(-1.96) 
-0.00082** 
(-2.04) 
-0.00082** 
(-2.04) 
-0.00093** 
(-2.18) 
Age of investment -0.117 
(-1.15) 
-0.117 
(-1.15) 
-0.119 
(-1.17) 
-0.121 
(-1.16) 
1-yr lag log GDP 0.0014 
(0.01) 
0.046 
(0.19) 
0.049 
(0.20) 
-0.056 
(-0.22) 
1-yr lag GDP g -3.974 
(-0.56) 
-5.160 
(-0.74) 
-6.113 
(-0.90) 
-7.528 
(-1.10) 
Firm Sector     
Financial -1.062* 
(-1.86) 
   
Infrastructure  0.250 
(0.55) 
  
Manuf & Serv   0.067 
(0.18) 
 
Agribusiness    0.796 
(1.52) 
     
Constant -0.540 
(-0.25) 
-1.065 
(-0.52) 
-1.012 
(-0.49) 
-0.188 
(-0.09) 
N (obs) 227 227 227 227 
LR chi-squared 14.38** 10.47* 10.21* 12.36** 
Pseudo R-squared 0.0712 0.0519 0.0506 0.0612 
All specified regression equations are computed as logit regressions. Dependent variable for all specifications is a 
dummy variable 𝑐𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑖𝑛𝑓𝑢𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖,𝑡, where 𝑐𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑖𝑛𝑓𝑢𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖,𝑡 is assigned a value of 1 for firm i at year t, if change 
in firm total investment for firm i from year t-1 to year t is greater than 0 and is assigned a value of 0 otherwise. 
𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚 𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖,𝑡 is defined as the number of employees for firm i  at year t. Age of investment is defined as the difference 
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between the current year, i.e. year t for firm i and the year of initial DFI investment into firm i, i.e. year t – n. 1-yr 
𝑙𝑎𝑔𝑔𝑒𝑑 𝑙𝑜𝑔 𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑗,𝑡  is the natural logarithm of GDP (in nominal US$) of firm domicile country j for firm i at year t-1. 
1-yr 𝑙𝑎𝑔𝑔𝑒𝑑 𝐺𝐷𝑃 𝑔𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ𝑗,𝑡 is defined as ∆1𝑦𝑟 𝑙𝑎𝑔𝑔𝑒𝑑 𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑗,𝑡 =  
GDPj,𝑡−1
GDPj,𝑡−2
− 1, where 𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑗,𝑡  is the GDP (in nominal 
US$) of firm domicile country j  for firm i at year t. 𝐹𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑖𝑎𝑙𝑖 is a dummy variable assigned a value of 1 if firm i 
belongs to the financial sector and 0 otherwise. 𝐼𝑛𝑓𝑟𝑎𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑢𝑐𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑖 is a dummy variable assigned a value of 1 if firm i 
belongs to the infrastructure or utilities sector and 0 otherwise. 𝑀𝑎𝑛𝑢𝑓 & 𝑆𝑒𝑟𝑣𝑖 is a dummy variable assigned a value 
of 1 if firm i belongs to the manufacturing or services sector and 0 otherwise. 𝐴𝑔𝑟𝑖𝑏𝑢𝑠𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑖 is a dummy variable 
assigned a value of 1 if firm i belongs to the agribusiness sector and 0 otherwise.LR chi-squared refers to likelihood-
ratio (LR) chi-square test statistic, which is a test on joint statistical significance of regression coefficients. Pseudo R-
squared refers to McFadden pseudo R-squared. Statistical significance of coefficients is denoted as follows:  
*P < 0.1; **P < 0.05; ***P < 0.01. 
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Appendix 2. 
Table A-3  
Summary statistics on net employment growth (𝑔𝑖,𝑡) for firm-year observations during which 
sample firm receiving additional DFI funding (treated group) and for firm-year observations 
during which sample firm did not receive additional DFI (control group). Statistics reported for 
all sample firms with available data and for years 2008 to 2014. 
 
Firm-years w/ additional DFI funding 
(treated) 
 Firm-years w/o additional DFI funding  
(control) 
 
N 
(obs) 
Mean Median St. Dev 
 
N (obs) Mean Median St. Dev 
Net employment growth 
(%) 
127 13.6% 6.8% 49.0% 
 
355 4.7% 4.2% 36.6% 
 
Table A-4 
Balancing test on explanatory variables for DID-PSM analysis. Treated group includes firm-year 
observations of sample firms that received additional DFI funding during the time period of 2008 
to 2014 and qualified for matching against a control group using the specified matching algorithm. 
Control includes firm-year observations of sample firms that did not receive additional DFI 
funding during 2008 to 2014 and are matched to treated group using the specified matching 
algorithm. 
 Mean  
 Treated Control T-stat 
NNM (ISM)    
Firm size  337.19 466.25 -0.66 
Age of investment 3.25 3.13 0.31 
1-yr lag GDP 7.81 7.98 -0.64 
1-yr lag GDP g 5.19% 4.69% 0.66 
Firm sector (financial) 0.16 0.16 0.00 
NNM (OSM)    
Firm size  365.24 444.18 -0.41 
Firm sector (financial) 0.06 0.0 1.00 
𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚 𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖,𝑡 is defined as the number of employees for firm i  at year t. Age of investment is defined as the difference 
between the current year, i.e. year t for firm i and the year of initial DFI investment into firm i, i.e. year t – n. 1-yr 
𝑙𝑎𝑔𝑔𝑒𝑑 𝑙𝑜𝑔 𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑗,𝑡  is the natural logarithm of GDP (in nominal US$) of firm domicile country j for firm i at year t-1. 
1-yr 𝑙𝑎𝑔𝑔𝑒𝑑 𝐺𝐷𝑃 𝑔𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ𝑗,𝑡 is defined as ∆1𝑦𝑟 𝑙𝑎𝑔𝑔𝑒𝑑 𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑗,𝑡 =  
GDPj,𝑡−1
GDPj,𝑡−2
− 1, where 𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑗,𝑡  is the GDP (in nominal 
US$) of firm domicile country j  for firm i at year t. 𝐹𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑖𝑎𝑙𝑖 is a dummy variable assigned a value of 1 if firm i 
belongs to the financial sector and 0 otherwise. Statistical significance of coefficients is denoted as follows:  
*P < 0.1; **P < 0.05; ***P < 0.01. 
